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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
under Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended* 
ISSUES 
The standard of review which is applicable to these issues 
is set forth in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983): 
with regard to questions of "law", at 608. 
"In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of 
general questions of law, this Court applies a 
correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the 
expertise of the Commission." 
- with regard to mixed questions of "law and fact", 
at 610. 
"...on these intermediate types of issues ...the Com-
mission's decisions must fall within the limits of 
reasonableness or rationality." 
I. SUBSTANTIVE 
A. In the Stone matter, did the Administrative Law Judge, 
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ruling that Krantz made a "false promise of a character 
likely to influence, persuade or induce", correctly 
conclude that: 
1. A licensee, acting as an officer of a principal in 
a transaction, has a duty to determine whether or 
not a promise can be performed before making the 
promise beyond a contracting party's obligation to 
exercise "good faith" ? 
law: correction of error, Utah Dep't of 
Admin, Servs. v, Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983). 
2. Failure by a licensee to determine whether or not 
a promise can be performed before making the prom-
ise is behavior so reckless as to render the pro-
mise false, even though the promise is conditional 
and the promisee has the right to void the agree-
ment in the event of non-occurrence of the 
contingency ? 
fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id. 
3. A debtor acts reasonably in relying on the promise 
of another to assume the debtor's obligation, even 
while agreeing with the promisor that the promise 
is subject to the assumability of the debt being 
verified and to the qualification of the promisor 
being approved by the creditor ? 
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fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id. 
4. The Stones relied on the promised assumption to 
their detriment even though an arbitration panel 
awarded their earnest money deposit to Krantz ? 
fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id. 
In the Gaster matter, did the Administrative Law Judge, 
ruling that Krantz committed a misrepresentation by 
omission, correctly conclude that: 
1. Krantz, acting as an agent and an officer of a 
principal, had a duty to disclose unpaid bills 
which might subject the property being acquired 
to mechanics liens when the purchasers had inde-
pendent representation throughout the transac-
tion ? 
- law: correction of error, Id. 
2. Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills 
was intentional even though it was found that he 
became aware of the seller's weak financial con-
dition only after closing ? 
- fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Ido 
3. The Gasters acted reasonably in relying on Krantz 
to disclose unpaid bills when they were repre-
sented by a licensee who knew or should have known 
how to protect them from mechanics lien liabil-
ity ? 
fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id, 
4. Any such misrepresentation was intentional and 
substantial, given the finding that the bills were 
paid and the liens discharged by the seller ? 
~ fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id, 
In the Gaster matter, did the Administrative Law Judge, 
ruling that Krantz breached his fiduciary duty to the 
Gasters, correctly conclude that Krantz owed them a 
fiduciary duty beyond closing ? 
- law: correction or error, Id, 
In Stone, was the Administrative Law Judge correct in 
applying section 61-2-20 as a prohibitive rather than 
a permissive provision ? 
- law: correction of error, Id, 
In Gaster, did the Administrative Law Judge, ruling 
that Krantz was "unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker", correctly conclude that: 
(1) Krantz had a duty to protect the interests of the 
Gasters after closing ? 
- law: correction of error, Id, 
(2) Krantz's failure to protect the Gasterfs interests 
after closing rendered him unworthy or incompetent 
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to protect the interests of the public even though 
he had an interest in the transaction as an 
officer of a party to the transaction ? 
- fact and law: reasonableness and rational-
ity, Id, 
PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
law: correction of error, Id, 
A. Did the Administrative Law Judge prejudicially violate 
the requirement of section 63-46b-10(1) that an order 
be issued within "a reasonable time of the hearing" 
when the hearing ended on May 30, 1991, and the reco-
mended order was issued on March 18, 1992 ? 
B. Did the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission 
prejudicially violate the requirement of section 63-
46b-10-(l)(e) that the order contain "a notice of the 
right to apply for reconsideration" when neither the 
recommended order of the judge nor the order of the 
Commission contained such a notice ? 
C. Did the failure of the Commission's order to acknow-
ledge that it differed from the recommended order 
render it so vague that the true understanding and in-
tent of the Commission is unknown and the order there-
fore unenforceable ? 
D. Does Krantz have an adequate opportunity to contest the 
agency's action as being "contrary to the agency's 
prior practice" as allowed under section 63-46b~16(4) 
(h)(iii) when: 
(1) The agency's interpretative rules fail to give 
adequate notice of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute ? 
(2) The agency does not publish summaries of its com-
plaint resolutions ? 
E. Were these and other procedural and administrative 
failures a denial of Krantz's right to due process 
the United States and Utah Constitutions ? 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
See Table of Authorities and Addendum, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the court on a Petition of Review from 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order 
("FFCLRO"; Addendum "A") of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
ensuing order of the Utah Real Estate Commission and Division of 
Real Estate (Addendum "B") revoking petitioner Krantz's license 
to practice real estate• 
The matters with respect to which review is sought arise 
from Krantz's dealing with two couples, the Stones and the 
Gasters. Based on these dealings, the Division initiated com-
plaints against Krantz, RE87-11-19 involving the Stones and 
RE89-03-12 involving the Gasters- FFCLRO pp. 8, 17. 
The hearing occurred on May 29-30, 1991; the FFCLRO was 
issued March 18, 1992; and the Commission issued its order on 
April 8, 1992. The Executive Director of the Department of 
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Commerce issued an Order on Review dated June 23, 1992. (Adden-
dum "C") 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Krantz was the principal broker of Copper State Realty 
("CSR") and the president of Copper State Construction ("CSC") 
when he engaged in four real estate transactions, two each with 
the Stones and the Gasters. With both the Stones and the Gasters, 
Krantz, as an officer of CSC, agreed to purchase their resi-
dences; and the Stones and the Gasters both agreed to purchase 
new residences to be built by CSC. FFCLRO, pp. 8-9, 17-18. 
In agreeing to purchase the Stone residence, Krantz, as an 
officer of CSC, promised to assume the Stone's existing loan 
secured by the property. His promise was conditioned upon CSC's 
"qualifying for and lending institution granting" the assump-
tion. Krantz intended that the assumption be "simple", but the 
Stones expected to be relieved of liability by CSC's either 
assuming or refinancing the loan. FFCLRO, pp0 8-9. 
The Stones relied on Krantz's promise in entering the agree-
ment with CSC, and neither CSC nor they were aware of the terms 
under which the loan could be assumed. FFCLRO, p. 9. However, 
the Stones had held out through a previous listing with another 
agent that their loan was assumable. Addendum "D". 
The parties eventually found out from the lender that there 
could be no "simple" or "formal" assumption of the loan by CSC. 
The Stones elected to void the agreement because CSC did not 
meet the qualification contingency. FFCLRO, p. 10. 
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In an arbitration through the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS, 
CSC was allowed to retain the Stone's $100 earnest money deposit 
from the transaction. FFCLRO, p. 11. 
With regard to the Stones agreement to purchase a newly 
constructed residence from CSC, Krantz filled out a form which 
differed from the one approved by the State for such transac-
tions. The agreement was subject to the Stones qualifying for 
financing. However, they were unable to qualify because CSC was 
to assume their loan in such a way as to relieve them of their 
existing mortgage indebtedness. They therefore voided the agree-
ment and were awarded the return of their $1500 earnest money 
deposit in the arbitration hearing. FFCLRO, pp. 9-11. 
In the Gaster transactions, an agent from a company other 
than CSR prepared the purchase agreements; and she represented 
the Gasters in their dealing with CSC in purchasing the newly 
constructed residence. Krantz did not represent the Gasters 
in this transaction (Addendum "E"). However, he did represent 
themin the sale of their residence to CSC. FFCLRO, p. 17. 
The Gasters appeared with their agent on April 28, 1988, 
to close their purchase from CSC, and Krantz appeared on be-
half of CSC. Some time between April 22, 1988, June 14, 1988, 
certain mechanics liens were filed on the Gasterfs new home. 
FFCLRO, pp. 18-19. 
Krantz did not inform the Gasters at closing that sub-
contractors or materialmen had not been paid, but he was not 
aware of CSC's "perilous financial condition" until after 
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closing. FFCLRO, pp. 19-20. 
CSC made the payment necessary to satisfy the lien 
claimants. FFCLRO, p. 19. 
With regard to CSC's purchase of the Gaster property, CSC 
assumed and agreed to pay their existing debt secured by the 
property. At closing Krantz reasonably believed that CSC would 
be able to make the necessary payments. However, after the 
Gaster closing until June 1988, other closings were delayed and 
sometimes did not occur with regard to properties built by CSC. 
During this time CSC lacked the funds to make the payments on the 
debt it assumed in the Gaster transaction. FFCLRO, pp. 18-19. 
Twice Gaster asked Krantz about the missed payments, leading 
in the first instance to a statement by Krantz that a payment had 
been made when there was no evidence that one been made and in 
the second instance to a statement by Krantz that he would at-
tempt to make the necessary payments. Krantz was aware of CSC's 
cash flow problems but took no action to protect the Gasters1 
interests after closing. FFCLRO, p. 19. 
In September, a notice of default was recorded, reflecting 
payments missed from June to September. After the issuance of a 
notice of sale in February, 1989, the Gasters settled with the 
secured creditor. FFCLRO, p. 19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. A. False Promise 
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Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz made a false promise of a 
character likely to influence, persuade or induce the Stones. 
1• Duty 
Krantz's only duty to the Stones with regard to the 
possibility of CSC's assuming their loan was to exercise 
good faith in making the promise. There is no finding of 
fact that good faith was lacking. Also the cases cited for 
holding Krantz to a higher standard are distinguishable. 
2. Recklessness 
If Krantz had simply made a promise to assume the loan 
without its being conditioned upon the verification with, 
and approval by, the Stones' lender, perhaps a case might be 
made for his behavior being reckless. However, the promise 
was conditional. 
A fortiori, Krantz's behavior was not reckless, and in 
fact it was responsible, given the fact that the Stones had 
the right to void their agreement with CSC, a right they 
exercised. 
3. Reasonable Reliance 
Regardless of Krantz's duty to the Stones and the 
characterization of his behavior, it was the Stones1 loan 
which was to be assumed. 
Before Krantz made the agreement with them on behalf 
of CSC, the Stones had the property on the market through 
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another agency and held it out as having an assumable loan. 
The CSC offer, subject to assumability, could not have come 
as a surprise to the Stones; and it was within their exclu-
sive control to contact the lender before offering the 
property for sale, and accepting an offer to purchase, sub-
ject to the loan's assumability. 
4. Detriment 
In an arbitration hearing regarding the disposition 
of CSC's $100 earnest money deposit, the panel ruled in 
Krantz!s favor. The Stones agreed to the arbitration. 
Concededly, damage is not essential for finding a 
violation of the licensing law. However, a finding of detri-
ment when either none existed or claims regarding damage 
had been freely resolved is substantially prejudicial 
to Krantz. 
II. B. Misrepresentation by Omission 
Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz intentionally made a sub-
stantial misrepresentation by omission in Caster. 
1. Duty to Disclose 
Utah law recognizes misrepresentation by omission, but 
not in the circumstances of this matter where those who al-
legedly suffered from the misrepresentation had indepen-
dent representation in the transaction. The doctrine of 
caveat emptor, although appropriately mitigated under 
modern law, has not been eliminated from commercial deal-
ings. 
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2. Intentional Failure 
The Administrative Law Judge does not even consider 
whether or not Krantz's omission might have been innocent 
or even negligent, but simply concludes that it was in-
tentional without stating why. 
Given the Judge's finding that Krantz became aware 
of CSC's weak financial condition only after the closing, 
a conclusion that the failure to disclose unpaid bills 
was intentional could only be based on unstated or assumed 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, the payment of the bills and discharge 
of the liens by CSC is inconsistent with the conclusion 
that Krantz's failure to disclose was intentional. 
3. Reasonable Reliance 
For the reasons set forth in II. B. 1., a conclusion 
that the Gasters could reasonably rely on Krantz's dis-
closure of unpaid bills ignores the role and responsibil-
ity of their representative in the transaction. No con-
sideration is given to the law of vicarious liability of 
a principal, the Gasters, for the negligence of their 
agent. 
4. Substantial Misrepresentation 
Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills at 
closing, assuming he was aware or should have been aware 
that they were unpaid, was without substantial effect. 
If the disclosure had been made, proceeds to the seller 
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from closing would have been escrowed to pay the bills. 
The outcome, given the nondisclosure, was the same as if 
funds had been escrowed at closing. 
I. C. Termination of Fiduciary Duty 
Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz breached his fiduciary duty 
to the Gasters. 
Krantz's duty as a fiduciary to the Gasters resulted 
from a limited agency created contractually between them. 
The terms of this agency relationship were set forth ex-
pressly in their written listing agreement, and they were 
fulfilled at closing. 
The Administrative Law Judge does not discuss the 
basis for finding that a fiduciary duty existed between 
Krantz and the Gasters after closing nor are any cases 
cited which would support such a conclusion. 
I. D. Use of Unapproved Form 
Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz's use of an unapproved form 
was a violation of law. 
Section 61-2-20 involves rights and privileges of 
real estate licensees with regard to the use of forms 
approved by the real estate commission and the attorney 
general. Its language is permissive, not prohibitive, 
in nature and should be read in conjunction with section 
78-51-25 regarding practicing law without a license. 
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I. E. Unworthiness or Incompetence 
Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative 
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz was unworthy or incompetent 
to act as a principal broker in such a manner as to safeguard 
the interests of the public because he did not protect the 
Gaster's interests after closing• 
The Administrative Law Judge determines that Krantz 
is unworthy or incompetent, but he does not determine 
whether it is because of unworthiness or incompetence that 
Krantz has violated section 61-2-11(8)• Furthermore, the 
Judge's broad conclusion is based on a finding that Krantz 
failed to protect the interest of the Gasters after 
closing• This conclusion has the effect of imposing upon 
licensees a fiduciary duty by statute when section 61-2-
11(16) explicitly envisions such a duty in terms more 
compatible and consistent with the common law doctrine of 
fiduciary duty. 
Procedural and administrative shortcomings with re-
gard to what constitutes unworthy or incompetent conduct 
are discussed in II. 
II. A. Timeliness of Order 
A distinction exists in administrative law between 
"mandatory" and "discretionary" statutory requirements, 
and there are cases which hold that "timing" require-
ments are discretionary. As such, they must result in 
"substantial prejudice" if violated to be of conse-
quence . 
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An almost ten-month time period between the hearing 
and the ruling is too long for the order to reflect a 
a fresh evaluation of the evidence by the Judge, 
Also the impending decision over the more ten 
months created an air of uncertainty surrounding CRS 
which had a negative impact on its business dealings. 
Be No Notice of Right to Apply for Reconsideration 
Neither the recommended order of the Administrative 
Law Judge nor the order of the Commission contained the 
"notice of right to apply for reconsideration" which is 
recognized under section 63-46b-10(l)(e). The statute is 
not limited by language referring to such right "if any 
exists". To deny Krantz his statutory right to such 
notice denied him an additional "bite at the apple", thus 
substantially prejudicing him. 
C. Uncertainty of Commission's Order 
The recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge 
was that Krantz's license to practice real estate as a 
principal broker be revoked. The Commission's order adopts 
the Judge's findings, conclusions and order; but it the 
revokes Krantz's real estate license without allowing him 
to practice as a sales agent. 
The order in this case is contradictory and leaves the 
impression that the Commission may not have understood, may 
not have carefully considered, or may not have fairly con-
strued the Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Recommended Order. 
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If the Commission did understand, carefully consider, 
and fairly construe the Judge's ruling, it did not state in 
its order reasons why it imposed a broader sanction. 
Finally, the Commission's order may be construed as a 
lifetime revocation with the right to reapply in three 
years; but it does not state the circumstances under which 
Krantz's license should be reinstated. 
II. D. Shortcomings in Agency's Prior Practice 
One of the bases for judicial review of formal adjudi-
cative proceedings is that the agency action is "contrary 
to prior agency practice". If an agency does not disclose 
to those it regulates what its prior practice has been, it 
denies them a statutory basis for review. 
Here the agency has cited no interpretative rules on 
which it relies in imposing its sanction, and it has pub-
lished no record of dispositions of prior complaints. 
This denial of a licensee's statutory right con-
administrative entrapment and is unconscionable. 
II. E. Denial of Due Process 
Any or all of the above procedural and administrative 
shortcomings constitute a violation of Krantz's right to due 
process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A. KRANTZ MADE NO FALSE PROMISE. 
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1. Sole duty of contracting promisor is to exercise 
good faith. 
More applicable to the Stone circumstances than any case 
cited by the Administrative Law Judge (FFCLRO, p. 12) is the 
Utah Supreme Court case of Cerritos Trucking Co, v. Utah Ven-
ture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982). 
Cerritos sought damages or specific performance under 
a option to purchase a warehouse, and Utah Venture sought 
to rescind the option based on a claim of misrepresentation. 
Utah Venture granted Cerritos a lease-option, relying on an 
unwritten representation by Cerritos that certain officers of 
another company, Fiber Sciences, would participate in the acqui-
sition under the option. Fiber Sciences occupied the warehouse 
as a sub-tenant of Cerritos under the lease with Utah Venture. 
Later, the parent company of Fiber Sciences informed the 
officers who were to participate in the acquisition that they 
could not do so because of a conflict of interest. Utah Venture-
claimed that it relied on Fiber Sciences participation, agree-
ing to sell the property at a lower price in the hope of gaining 
future business considerations. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld a ruling in favor of Cerritos, 
finding with regard to the promised participation of the Fiber 
Sciences officers that the "evidence reflects nothing but good 
faith on their part". Id. at 611. 
Although Utah Venture argued that the Fiber Sciences offi-
cers should have first sought a legal opinion regarding their 
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participation before the representation was made, the Court dis-
agreed. Citing Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P.2d 56, 58 
(1933), the Court concluded that, "if the promise is made in good 
faith when the contract is entered into, there is no fraud 
though the promisor subsequently changes his mind and fails or 
refuses to perform". 
In Stone, there is no finding of bad faith on the part of 
Krantz, but only findings that his intent and that of the Stones 
regarding the concept of "assumption" differed. 
It's not as if Krantz and the Stones agreed, as did the 
parties in Cerritos, and then Krantz changed his mind and did 
not perform. Instead, the parties performed exactly as they had 
agreed, with the Stones exercising their right to void the agree-
ment when CSC did not qualify for the assumption under an ex-
pressly stated contingency. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Welch Transfer and 
Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), involving a 
real estate exchange contingent upon both parties assuming the 
other's SBA loan and being relieved of liability in each case, 
"[t]hose mutual conditions were essential as far as both parties 
were concerned to the consummation of the exchange .... In the 
instant case, neither party could control the actions of the 
S.B.A. and neither party was at fault in the failure of an 
essential condition precedent." Id. at 76. 
Krantz, as the promisor under the contract with the Stones, 
was in the same position as either of the parties in Welch 
Transfer. 
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In the case of Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc,f 
22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P.2d 743, 746 (1969), the Court states, 
quoting form Ephraim Theatre Co, v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 
P.2d 221 (1958): 
* * * Generally speaking, neither of the parties, 
nor the court has an right to ignore or modify condi-
tions which are clearly expressed merely because it 
may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they 
must be enforced "in accordance with the intention as 
* * manifested by the language used by the parties to 
the contract." 
In Stone, the Administrative Law Judge ignored in his 
findings the contingent nature of the agreement between the 
Stones and Krantz. Additionally, the Judge makes no note of 
the fact that the contingency regarding the assumption was 
to the benefit of the Stones; and if it was a hardship on 
anyone, it was a hardship on CSC and Krantz. 
This failure of the Judge to consider the contingent 
nature of the promise to assume is evidenced by his citing 
Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (UtahApp. 
1989) and Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
In Galloway, the representation of the AFCO representative 
which was found to be false was not contingent on the veri- * 
fication and approval of a third party. In Von Hake, the 
issues were the fairness of the parties1 agreement and the 
possibility of undue influence by one with a confidential 
relationship with the other. 
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The very contingent nature of Krantz's promise to the 
Stones strongly supports a finding of good faith and fairness; 
and the possibility of undue influence was not address by the 
Judge. 
Reductio ad absurdum, the Administrative Law Judge, by 
his conclusion that Krantz made a false promise to the Stones, 
is suggesting that a real estate licensee, acting on behalf of 
a principal, must eliminate third-party approval contingencies 
from all purchase agreement. 
For all of these reasons, the Judge's conclusion that 
Krantz, acting as an officer for CSC, had a duty to determine 
whether or not his promise could be performed before making it 
was erroneous, given the absence of a finding of bad faith and 
the nature of his promise as being contingent on the approval 
of a third party with the Stones having the right to void the 
contract if the approval was not obtained. 
2. If good faith is not the correct standard for eval-
uating Krantz1s conduct and recklessness is, he did 
not act recklessly. 
It is true that a finding of recklessness can provide a 
basis for concluding that misrepresentation has occurred. How-
ever, the Administrative Law Judge ruled that Krantz violated 
section 61-2-11(2) dealing with "false promises", not section 
61-2-11(1) dealing with "misrepresentation". Nonetheless, 
whether the Judge is operating under -11(1) or -11(2), it is 
difficult to understand how he found Krantz's behavior to be 
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reckless, given the contingent nature of his promise and its 
design to benefit the Stones as discussed above. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Boston First Nat, 
v. Salt Lake Ctv. Bd.. 799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 1990), observed 
that an agency's decision must not be "a creation of fiat". 
Boston First Nat, deals with the application of the "sub-
stantial evidence" test involving findings of facts and does 
not involve a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law as 
in Stone regarding the issue of recklessness. As such, how-
ever, it is even more applicable given the higher standard of 
review in the Stone circumstances. 
Recklessness, a term the Administrative Law Judge does 
not define, is commonly understood in the context of the law 
regarding fraud and deceit to mean reckless disregard for 
the truth. See Hull at 58. 
Krantz's behavior, "subjecting" the Stones to a con-
tractual covenant contingent upon third-party verification 
of the loan's assumability hardly demonstrates a disregard for 
the truth; and his providing the Stones with an option to void 
the agreement if verification and approval are not obtained, can 
hardly be considered reckless behavior under any meaning of the 
term. To have made the promise verbally but not in writing, to 
have made it not contingent upon verification by the lender, 
to have granted CSC the right to void the agreement if the 
verification was not forthcoming, ... any of these actions might 
have arguably been considered a reckless disregard for the truth; 
but Krantz did none of these reckless acts, and therefore the 
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Judge erred in his conclusion. 
3. The Stones reliance on Krantz's promise was 
unreasonable. 
The Montana case of Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 588 P. 2d 988 
(Mont. 1978) involved the issue of whether or not a party to 
a real estate transaction could rely as a matter of law on 
representations alleged to have been made by a real estate 
licensee. Quoting Lee v. Stockmen's National Bank, 63 Mont. 
262, 284, 207 P. 623, 630 (1922), the court noted: 
When it appears that a party, who claims to have 
been deceived to his prejudice, has investigated 
for himself or that the means were at hand to 
ascertain the truth ... of any representations made 
to him, his reliance upon such representations made 
to him, however false thev may be. affords no 
ground of complaint. Van Ettinger at 994. 
The loan which Krantz agreed CSC would assume was the 
Stones1 loan, yet the Administrative Law Judge found that they 
had no knowledge of the terms under which it could be assumed. 
Still the Stones, when they had their property listed for sale 
through Multiple Listing with another agent held out one of the 
financing terms to be "AE", assume existing loan. They, more 
than Krantz or any one else, had it at their disposal to com-
municate directly with the lender and determine the nature of 
the assumability of the loan. 
Also it is difficult to imagine the Stones acting in rea-
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sonable reliance on Krantz's promise, given its contingent 
nature, before the contingency was met. In a case where the con-
tingent nature of a contractual promise was much less clear 
than in Stone, the court concluded that the parties understood 
that the promisor's obligation to perform was contingent. Creer 
v. Thurman. 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). 
Again, the Administrative Law Judge errs in drawing no legal 
conclusion from the contingent nature of the promise on which 
the Stones allegedly rely. 
4. Stones suffered no harm. 
The Stones and Krantz submitted their claims regarding the 
$100 earnest money deposit to arbitration, and the award was made 
to Krantz. The release of the deposit to Krantz is inconsistent 
with a conclusion that the Stones were damaged. 
Although a finding of damage is not necessary in resolving 
a real estate licensing law complaint, it would be prejudicial 
to find damage when none should have been found. 
The Restatement of Agency 2d, paragraph 419, states: 
An agent who has committed a breach of duty to the 
principal is discharged from liability by an effec-
tive release given by the principal or a contract 
with the principal having the effect of a dis-
charge . 
The conclusion of the arbitration panel that the deposit 
should be awarded to Krantz and the release of Krantz from 
further liability should be determinative that the Stones 
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were not damaged in the transactions, and the Judge erred 
to Krantz's substantial prejudice in concluding otherwise. 
I. B. KRANTZ MADE NO MISREPRESENTATION BY OMISSION, 
1. Krantz had no duty to disclose unpaid bills. 
In contrast to the Stone matter regarding the "false pro-
mise" charge where the Administrative Law Judge cites (we have 
suggested ineffectually) many cases to support his conclusion 
that Krantz violated section 61-2-11(2), in the Gaster matter 
the Judge cites no cases to support his conclusion that Krantz 
made a substantial misrepresentation by omission. 
This is another example of the creation of a decision by 
fiat. See Boston First Nat, at 1166. 
If we try to make the Judge's case for him, we might go 
back to the cases he cites in the Stone matter, starting with 
what may be regarded as the leading case in Utah involving mis-
representation by a real estate licensee, Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 
1986). Dicta in Dugan contains the very broad pronouncement 
that "[i]n this state, it is apparent that the rule of 
caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a real 
estate agent". Id. at 1248. 
Dugan and its progeny are distinguishable from Gaster for 
any of three reason: (1) they involve affirmative misrepresen-
tation, not misrepresentation by omission; (2) they involve only 
one licensee; (3) they involve matters which are disclosable 
without conflicting loyalties to a principal. 
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Much has happened within the real estate industry since 
1980-86 to cause one to question the breadth in application of 
the Court's dictum. Most particularly, in 1987 the Utah Real 
Estate Division adopted an administrative rule which requires 
licensees to disclose their agency relationship in a trans-
action to the principals. Now both buyer and seller know who 
represents whom in a transaction, and it is now much more com-
mon for buyers to have an agent representing them while an-
other agent represents the seller. See Utah Administrative 
Code, R162-6-2-7. 
So it was in the Gaster case when their representative, not 
Krantz, filled out a purchase agreement which did not provide 
for extended title insurance coverage protecting against mechan-
ics liens. Was it Krantz's duty then, as a fiduciary of the 
seller, to volunteer such coverage in a counteroffer to avoid 
misrepresenting by omission his "duty" to the Gasters ? 
And the same issue was present when the Gasters closed with 
their representative present and then failed to inquire regarding 
the possibility of there being unpaid bills which might result in 
mechanics liens. The Administrative Law Judge did not just sug-
gest, he has concluded, that it was Krantz's duty, notwithstand-
ing his status as a fiduciary of the seller, to disclose that 
there were unpaid bills whether he knew of their existence or 
not. 
The Administrative Law Judge has erred in not reconcil-
ing Krantz•s fiduciary duty to the seller with his alleged 
-28-
statutory duty to the buyer and in not talcing into account 
the role and responsibility of the Gasters' own agent in the 
transaction and its impact on Krantz1s statutory duty. 
2. Krantz^ failure to disclose was not intentional. 
Even if Krantz had a duty to disclose unpaid bills at 
closing to the Gasters, the Judge's conclusion that he did so 
intentionally is again created by "fiat". One would be hard 
pressed to arrive at a conclusion that Krantzfs failure was 
negligent, yet the Judge concludes that the omission was 
intentional. 
The Judge found that Krantz was unaware of CSC's weak 
financial condition only after the closing. He also found 
that the bills were paid by CSC and the liens discharged. Yet 
he concludes that Krantz "should have" disclosed the indebted-
ness at closing. 
In Smith v. Galland and Associates, Inc., 602 P.2d 1197, 
1202, (Wash.App. 1979), there was no breach of fiduciary duty 
when a licensee failed to protect a party's interests regarding 
mechanics liens when the builder subsequently discharged them. 
Additionally, there was no conclusion that a duty had been 
breached under the statute. 
It was erroneous for the Judge to conclude that Krantz"s 
omission was intentional when it may very well not have even 
been negligent. 
3. The Gasters reliance on Krantz1s misrepresentation 
by omission was not reasonable. 
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On whom were the Gasters relying in this transaction, 
Krantz who represented the seller or the other agent who rep-
resented them ? 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Gasters 
relied on Krantz without even discussing their relationship 
with, and the role of, the agent who actually was their repre-
sentative. And then the Judge concluded that their reliance on 
Krantz was reasonable ! 
Does the Administrative Law Judge cite cases to support 
these conclusions ? Again, the answer is no ... another de-
cision created by fiat. 
If Krantz committed intentional, or even negligent, 
misrepresentation, wasn't the Gasters' agent a fortiori respon-
sible for misrepresentation ? And shouldn't the Gasters bear the 
responsibility for their agent's misrepresentation ? 
The Judge was wrong in concluding that the Gasters relied 
reasonably on Krantz's misrepresentation. 
4. If there was a misrepresentation, it was not substan-
tial. 
Would the transaction have closed if Krantz had disclosed 
that the bills were unpaid ? Yes. Why ? ... because when the 
liens were disclosed after the closing, CSC paid the bills and 
discharged the liens. How can this be ? ... because the alter-
native, no closing, would have benefited neither CSC nor the 
Gasters. Worst case scenario, funds would have been escrowed to 
cover unpaid bills, and the liens would have been discharged 
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from escrow ... the same outcome as occurred with non-disclosure. 
Therefore, it was not reasonable, and in fact was prejudi-
cial, for the Judge to conlcude that the omission was nsubstan-
tial". 
II. C. KRANTZ OWED THE GASTERS NO FIDUCIARY DUTY AFTER 
CLOSING. 
Boettcher PTC Blda. v. Falcon Ventures, 762 P.2d 788 
(Colo.App. 1988), involved a question of whether or not a 
leasing agent had a continuing obligation to the landlord 
during the term of the lease with regard to the agent's 
relationships with the landlord and a tenant of the landlord. 
The agent had been instrumental in the tenant's nego-
tiating a lease with the landlord, representing the land-
lord in the transaction as a cooperating broker. However, 
when the tenant, after taking possession, was unable to nego-
tiate with the landlord for additional space, the agent as-
sisted the tenant in finding another space; and the tenant 
defaulted on the lease with the original landlord. 
The Court rejected the landlord's contention that the 
agent had breached a duty of loyalty to the landlord in 
helping the tenant find another space, holding that there 
was no evidence of agreement between the landlord and the 
agent that the agent's duty would extend beyond his per-
formance as cooperating broker in the original transac-
tion. Id. at 790. 
* * * Upon termination of the agency, an agent 
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commended order of the Administrative Law Judge, its order in 
this case is internally contradictory and leaves one with the 
impression that the Commission may not have understood, may 
not have considered, or may not have fairly construed the 
Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended 
Order. See Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 187, 14 
Po2d 973 (1932). 
If the Commission did understand, carefully consider, and 
fairly construe the Judge's ruling, it did not state in its 
order explicitly that it was imposing a broader sanction; and 
it did not articulate the reasons why it decided to impose a 
broader sanction. 
Finally, the Commission's order may be construed as a 
lifetime revocation with the right to re-apply in three years; 
but it does not state the circumstances under which Krantz's 
license should be reinstated, leaving open the very real pos-
sibility that a Commission with three new members in three 
years might feel compelled to review the matter de novo. 
For amy of these reasons, Krantz is substantially pre-
judiced. 
II. D. Shortcomings in the agency's prior practices have 
substantially prejudiced Krantz. 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) provides that one of the bases 
for granting relief upon judicial review is that the petitioner 
has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action which is 
"contrary to the agency's prior practice". 
What safeguards might the drafters of the Administrative 
Procedures Act have been contemplating by inserting this provi-
sion in the statute ? 
1. consistency 
Most would agree that the concept of consistency is 
an essential element in the fair administration of justice. 
Therefore, it makes sense that an agency's action must be 
consistent with prior practice. If it is not, it is implic-
itly a requirement that the agency action under review 
must either be distinguishable from prior practice or be 
supported by policies which justify a contrary practice. 
How then does one discover what the agency's prior 
practice has been, and how does one become aware of the 
policies which underlie the agency's action ? 
2. disclosure 
Implicit under the section is a requirement that 
the agency must make known to those it regulates what its 
prior practices are. Otherwise, the agency effectively in-
sulates itself from accountability under the consistency 
standard by cloaking its actions in secrecy. 
The Utah Real Estate Division and the Utah Real Estate 
Commission do not publish for the benefit of licensees what 
complaints the agency pursues and how the cases are re-
solved. The public that the licensing law seeks to protect 
and licensees, too, have a right to learn from the misadven-
tures of brokers and agents who have run amiss with the law 
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through complaints brought by the Division, 
Yet even if complaint resolutions are published, by 
what standard is the outcome of these resolutions to be 
measured ? 
3. rulemaking 
An integral part of the administrative process is the 
establishment of standards through rulemaking, a process 
which itself is subject to the rules of administrative pro-
cedure. If the agency brings an action on a complaint based 
on matters not addressed in its rules, it is participating 
in a process which is fraught with traps for unwary licen-
sees and which protects the interests of the public through 
punitive rather than preventive measures. 
In Topik, this court upheld the concept of "peer eval-
uation" in lieu of specific standards for regulating a 
subject "too comprehensive to be codified in detail". Topik 
at 34, quoting from Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 
(Utah 1983). However, these matters were not subject to 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
The simple fact that the Administrative Law Judge 
cites not one agency regulation supporting his legal 
conclusions among the many issues under review in this case 
should be sufficient grounds for this court's inquiring into 
the adequacy of the Division's regulations. (The only issue 
addressed by interpretative regulation is the approved form 
issue. See I. D. and U.A.C. R162-6-1, R162-6-2.) 
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In this case, such commonly encountered questions such 
the following have been raised which might readily have been 
answered by interpretative regulations: 
Will a licensee's promise be questioned when he 
acts in good faith while entering into a contract 
as a principal with a non-licensee ? 
What does "assume" mean in the state-approved 
purchase agreement ? 
Will a licensee be held accountable for a non-
licensee's misunderstanding of a term such as 
"assume" which, though ambiguous, is used with-
out clarification in a state-approved form ? 
Will a licensee be found at fault for relying 
on his ability as a principal to make a contin-
gent contractual promise as expressly allowed 
under a state-approved form ? 
Under what circumstances will a licensee with 
a fiduciary duty to one principal in a transaction 
be held accountable for non-disclosures to the 
other principal when that other principal is 
independently represented by another licensee ? 
When does a licensee's duty as a fiduciary end ? 
Is a licensee, acting as a principal, prohibited 
from using a form which is not approved by the 
State ? 
Is a principal required to use a state-approved 
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form whenever a licensee is involved in a trans-
action ? 
Can a licensee he found "unworthy or incompetent" 
for failing to perform a duty which does not 
otherwise exist under the law ? 
If the professional conduct of a real estate licensee 
cannot be addressed comprehensively under regulations, is it 
not possible that at least the fundamentals be addressed ? 
And absent a statement of the agency's position with regard 
to the fundamentals of compliance with the licensing law, 
are not licensees substantially prejudiced and the public 
interest poorly served ? 
In D.B v, Div. of Occupational Pro, Licensing, 779 P,2d 1145 
(UtahApp. 1989), this court examined section 63-46b-16(4)(e) and 
found substantial prejudice when petitioner's cross-examination 
rights were violated. 
Likewise in Krantz# for the reasons set forth above f the 
petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's 
failure to operate under rules and procedures which provide 
licensees the full opportunity to challenge the agency's 
actions as provided under the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
II. E. THE AGENCY'S FAILURES IN FOLLOWING STATUTORY PROCEDURES 
AND 
AND 
IN ESTABLISHING STANDARDS 
ACCOUNTABILITY CONSTITUTE 
PROCESS 
FOR PROPHYLACTIC GUIDANCE 
A 











Utah courts have appropriately avoided constitutional issues 
in matters such as this, finding instead substantial prejudice 
when agencies have violated statutory provisions such as those 
set forth above. See for example, the case of D.B. But see 
Jackson v. State ex Rel. Workers' Comp., 786 P.2d 874, 878 
(Wyo. 1990) where the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges the 
applicability of due process standards of fairness under the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. See Constitution of 
the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1; Constitution 
of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
However, the finding of the Utah Supreme Court in Vance 
that "[m]embers of a profession can properly be held to under-
stand its standards of performance" when applied to the real 
estate profession may unfairly give too much credit to the 
sophistication of licensees. See Vance at 129. Vance dealt 
with the license of a physician; and whether the court was 
flattering real estate professionals in Topik or innocently 
putting down the academic credentials of physicians, it is 
simply unfair to assume that real estate licensees have the 
same professional preparation and sophistication as do 
physicians. 
Physicians have weighty responsibilities and live every 
day with tremendous ethical obligations; but, to give just one 
example, they don't have to unravel, without regulatory guidance, 
the nuances of the law of agency and the responsibilities of 
a fiduciary. 
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Consider the content of real estate pre-licensing school 
curricula and pre-licensing examinations, all approved by the 
Utah Real Estate Division and ask: Will a newly licensed sales 
agent be prepared to comply with the obligations set forth un-
der the licensing law ? 
Then consider the extent to which the Division provides 
broker education courses and the extent to which the Division 
monitors the efforts of brokers to supervise the activities of 
sales agents. 
Ask licensees, whether rookies or veterans, to answer the 
questions asked in II. D. above. 
Then ask whether or not the rationale of Vance applies 
to members of the real estate profession. The answer will be 
that it does not. 
These issues are raised not to belittle the competence of 
real estate professionals in general, but to put matters in a 
more realistic perspective. 
The Utah Real Estate Division does a commendable job given 
its rigid budgetary constraints, and the Real Estate Commission-
ers give generously of their time in service of their industry 
and the public. However, the matter of Krantz exemplifies how 
the current administrative and regulatory structure and operation 
under the real estate licensing law is just not fair. 
In Topik, the Utah Supreme Court issued a veiled invita-
tion for challenges to the application of the first two of the 
three rationales supporting the Vance decision. See Topik at 
35. 
-44-
The invitation set forth in Topik is hereby accepted. 
If for no reason previously suggested the order revoking 
Krantz's license to practice real estate is not reversedf it 
should be now, given the lack of fundamental fairness and the 
resulting denial of due process resulting from the regulatory 
deficiencies identified in this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's order revoking Krantz's license should be 
reversed; and if not reversed, remanded for a resolution of the 
errors set forth in this brief. 
Additionally, the Court should award Krantz his costs of 
defending against the agency's complaints and of obtaining re-
lief upon judicial review, including his reasonable attorney's 
fees, as provided under sections 61-2-12(2)(b) and 78-27a. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 6th day of November 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF TOE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Randy R. Krantz to Act as a OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Principal Broker : Case No. RE87-11-19 
Case No. RE89-03-12 
Appearances: 
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate 
Nicholas E. Hales and Brenda G. Eichers for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of an August 
21. 1989 Notice of Agency Action. The notice was sent by certified mail and received by a 
Rachael Kranu on August 22, 19<S9. As set torth in the notice. Respondent was iequired to 
file a written response with thirty (30) days from the date of the notice. 
Respondent did not timely file the written response. By motion, dated November 27, 
1989, the Division sought entry of Respondent's default. Respondent appeared for a 
December 12. 19S9 hearing on the pending motion before J. Steven Eklund. Administratis 
Law Judge for the Department ot Commerce. Given Respondent's appearance and his 
assurance a written response would be filed within .• reasonable time, the Court took the 
11, 1990. He was also afforded the opporiunity to obtain to legal counsel for purposes of this 
proceeding. 
On January 11, 1990, Respondent filed a response in both this proceeding and another 
case which had been initiated (RE89-03-12). Pursuant to a July 31, 1990 notice, both cases 
were scheduled to be heard on August 28, 1990. However, Respondent filed a motion for 
summary judgment with respect to each case on August 23, 1990. The Division filed 
responses to those motions on September 20, 1990 and Respondent filed a final reply as to 
each motion on October 11, 1990. 
On March 6, 1991, the Court entered a recommended order as to each motion. On 
March 13, 1991, the Utah Real Estate Commission and David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
of the Department of Commerce, adopted the recommended orders which had been submitted. 
By notice, dated April 2, 1991, both cases were rescheduled to be heard on May 29-30, 1991. 
The hearing for the consolidated cases was so conducted and evidence was offered and 
received 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order with respect to 
both cases for review by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division 
of Real Estate: 
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation I) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal 
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either 
1975 or 1976 and he received his broker's license in 1985. 
2 In March 19X7, Cclso Velez contacted Max Lloyd a sales agent affiliated with 
Copper State Realty, icgaiding one oi the brokerage's listings Mr Vole/ and Mr Lloyd 
discussed a possible trade of the Velez home. No such trade occurred, but Respondent 
subsequently contacted Mr. Velez and indicated he had potential buyers for the Velez home. 
Mr. Velez agreed to pay a commission when Respondent inquired if he would do so, should 
Respondent sell the home to the potential buyers Respondc • informed Mi Velez the 
potential buyers, Phil and Jan Wilson, were his m-laws. 
the Wilsons otteied to puichase the Velez home toi S75,UUU The otlei piovided toi a So.l5U 
cash down payment and a $71,750 FHA loan to be obtained by the Wilsons. The Velez's 
agreed to pay $1,000 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs. Mr. Velez and 
Respondent agreed the latter would receive a 6% commission, totalling $4,500. The Wilsons 
had provided Respondent with a $100 personal check as earnest money to be deposited on 
acceptance of the offer and the transaction was to close on or before May 15, 1987. Sparing 
detail, the Velez's accepted the offer on April 12, 1987 and Respondent deposited the earnest 
2 
money into the Copper State Realty trust account on April 13, 1987. 
4. When the Wilsons had not obtained necessary financing by May 15, 1987, the 
lender notified Respondent an addendum or another earnest money sales agreement had to be 
executed since the closing date had passed. The lender also informed Respondent the amount 
of closing costs the Velez's had agreed to pay would reduce the maximum amount the 
-Wilseae-eeuld borrow? 
5. On May 20, 1987, Respondent prepared a second earnest money sales agreement, 
which also reflected a $75,000 purchase price. The Wilson's offer provided for an $800 
earnest money deposit in the form of "check and cash" (presumably $700 cash in addition to 
the previous $100 check already deposited in Respondent's trust account), a $2,450 cash 
down payment and the same amount to be financed as in the April 5, 1987 offer. Since that 
offer had been made, loan discount points had decreased. Respondent so informed the 
Velez's, who agreed to pay $400 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs with the 
understanding Respondent's commission would thus increase to $5,100. 
6 Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent told Mr Velez that he 
(Respondent) might luxe to lend monies to the Wilsons to help with then down payment dnd 
Respondent may have also told Mi. Velez those monies would come fiom his commission. 
However, Mr. Velez does not know whether any such payment was made and there is no 
other direct or circumstantial evidence Respondent provided any such funds to the Wilsons. 
7. On May 20, 1987, the Velez's accepted the offer and the Wilsons provided a $400 
check U) Respondent payable h» Coppei Suite Realty, as some of the additional s7UO m 
earnest money to be paid. Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent leceived the 
additional 7^UU earnest money in his uu.Nt account because tne uansauion was scneduied to 
close on May 22, 1987. less than 72 hours later. 
8. On May 20, 1987, a Mick Quigley (who is Ms. Wilson's father) executed a gift 
letter whereby he certified he had or would provide $2,250 to Ms. Wilson prior to the closing 
to be applied toward the Wilson's purchase of the Velez home. Mr. Quigley further certified 
he expected no repayment from the Wilsons in that regard. Based on the credible evidence 
presented, Mr. Quigley provided about $1,500 of those funds (for the benefit of the Wilsons) 
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to Respondent's wife (who is also Mr. Quigley's daughter) approximately one (1) week prior 
to the closing of the transaction. Those funds were either deposited in Respondent's wife's ' 
personal account or their joint checking account. This record does not reflect when Mr. 
Quigley provided the remaining funds to Respondent. 
9. On May 22, 1987, Respondent issued a $2,000 check to Brighton Bank, which was 
thea used-to purchase a-May 22y 1987 cashiers cheok-<otallk*g>-$h45QM payable, to American 
Equity (the Wilson's lender on their purchase of the Velez home). The transaction closed on 
May 22, 1987 and the Wilsons obtained the funds necessary to close on that transaction from 
proceeds derived from the sale of their prior home and the gift monies made available by Mr. 
Quigley. On May 27, 1987, the Velez's issued a $600 check to Respondent, representing the 
additional commission they had agreed to pay him with regard to the sale of their home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides a real estate licensee 
may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as 
an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(I) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principle broker . . . as to 
safeguard the interests of the public . . .; 
(15) violating or disregarding the rules adopted by the commission and the 
division: 
( 16) breaching a fiducial) .:::ty «»v.e«j b\ a licensee1 t«» his principle in a real 
estate transaction . . . 
Spccnicaiiy. ihe u m s i o n CUIIICUUN r\e.N|>ui.ucni i cp ioemcu in the \<ric/ > ami liu* i.iuier ik* 
had $800 in earnest money from the Wilsons when he allegedly only had $100 on deposit in 
that regard. The Division also asserts Respondent represented to the lender the Wilsons 
would receive a portion of their down payment as a gift from Mr. Quigley when those funds 
were allegedly given to the Wilsons from Respondent. 
During the instant hearing, the Division presented testimony from Mr. Velez, the 
Wilsons and Respondent as to the Velez-Wilson transaction. The Court has considered that 
testimony with due regard for the respective ability of each witness to recall the various 
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aspects of the transaction. The Court has also duly considered the manner in which testimony 
may have been affected by the self interest of a given witness and/or the respective familial 
relationships between some of those witnesses. In many instances, the testimony offered by a 
given witness was vague. In certain respects, relatively credible testimony offered by one 
witness was either irreconcilable with the equally credible testimony of another witness or 
relevant factual issues were not adequately addressed. Given the lack of credible and-
substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's just-described assertions 
are without a sufficient factual basis. Thus, the Division has failed to satisfy its burden of 
proof regarding Count I. 
With respect to Section 61-2-11(15), the Division asserts Respondent violated R174-4-
2. That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
4.2 All monies received in a real estate transaction must be 
deposited in a separate non-interest bearing "Real Estate Trust 
Account" in a Utah bank, credit union, savings and loan, or other 
approved escrow depository in this state . . .. 
4,2.1 All monies received by a licensee in a real 
estate transaction, whether it be cash or check must be 
delivered to the principal broker and deposited within three 
banking days after receipt of the funds by the licensee. 
4.2.5 All consideration represented as received 
by a licensee on an Earnest Mone> Sales Agreement or their 
document must have, in fact, been received by the licensee 
money irom me wiisons or ne oiu not ucpo.Mt in<-*r IUIKIN HI IU.N HUM aco«uiu. viiven tnc 
credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's initial 
assertion that Respondent did not receive the funds in question lacks a sufficient factual basis. 
Thus, the Division has not established that R 174-4-2(4.2.5) has been violated. 
It is evident Respondent did not deposit the additional earnest money in his trust 
account Further, none of the three exceptions to R 174-4-2(4.2.1) apply in this case. The 
just-stated rule expressly requires a licensee to deposit the funds within three banking days 
after receipt of those funds. However, that rule is silent whether such a deposit is required if 
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the transaction will close and the funds will be disbursed within three banking days of their 
receipt by the licensee. 
R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should be applied with due regard for the facts and circumstances of 
this case and in recognition of the purpose for that rule, which is to ensure that funds 
received by a licensee are properly deposited in trust for the benefit of the party entitled to 
those funds. The"closing'staSraent reflectTRSspondentTetained the $800 earnest money he 
had received and then offset the commission due to him from the Velez's by that amount 
The earnest money was thus effectively disbursed, consistent with the terms of the May 20, 
1987 earnest money sales agreement, notwithstanding the fact that said funds were not 
previously deposited in Respondent's trust account Since the rule would allow Respondent 
three banking days from his receipt of the funds to deposit those funds and the closing on this 
transaction occurred prior to that time, compliance with R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should not be 
required under those circumstances and no basis exists to conclude Respondent violated that 
rule in this case. Thus, Count II is without merit 
The Division contends Respondent is unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker Specifically, the Division asserts Respondent misicpiesented the natine ol the 
transaction to the lender as the means to enable the Wilsons to obtain linancing they would 
not have otherwise obtained. The Division also argues Respondent manipulated the 
transaction: (1) to obtain a larger commission than the Velez's had originally agreed to pay 
or (2) to secure more commission funds to be given to the Wilsons to help them purchase the 
Vele/ hnnv 
Given the lack of credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the 
is no suificient evidence Respondent misrepresented the natuie of this transaction with respect 
to either the amount of earnest monies paid by the Wilsons or the source of the gift monies. 
The compelling and pivotal testimony on those factual matters should have been forthcoming 
from the Wilsons. However, their testimony was either vague or evasive in numerous 
respects. The Division has thus failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to Count HI. 
Finally, the Division urges Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the Velez's and 
thus failed to act in their best interest when he prepared the second earnest money sales 
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agreement to cither obtain a larger commission or secure more commission funds to be given 
to the Wilsons to help them purchase the home. Concededly, the operative effect of that 
agreement enabled the Wilsons to borrow additional funds to purchase the Velez home. The 
second earnest money sales agreement also shifted $600, which the Wilsons would have paid 
in discount points for the benefit of the Wilsons, to Respondent in the form of an increased 
commission. 
Arguably, the Velez's could have negotiated to obtain the benefit of the decrease in 
discount points which occurred in the interim with respect to the two offers made by the 
Wilsons in this transaction. However, the Velez's understood the changes made by the 
second earnest money sales agreement (particularly that Respondent would receive a higher 
commission), they realized their net proceeds from the sale would remain the same and they 
agreed to thus accept the May 20, 1987 offer and sell their home under those circumstances. 
Based on the foregoing, no breach of fiduciary duty has been established and Count IV is 
without merit 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Counts HV, as set forth in Case No. RKS7-1 1-19, 
be dismissed and no disciplinary action be entered in that regard. 
Dated this 1<ST^ day of March, 1992. 
J( pteven Elflund 
Aaministrative Law Judge 
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Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation H) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal 
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either 
1975 or 1976. From 1979 to 1984, Respdriaerif was the vice president 15f WestsfflT" 
Development, a construction company. During that time, Respondent was involved in the 
construction of approximately 70 new homes in that capacity. Respondent received his 
principal broker's license in 1985. Since late-1985, Respondent has been the president of 
Copper State Construction. During that time, Respondent was involved in the construction of 
over 100 new homes in that capacity. 
2. In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a condominium located in 
Taylorsville, Utah. Based on a referral from a co-worker for whom Copper State 
Construction had built a home, the Stones contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with 
Copper State Realty. The Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's 
condominium to Copper State Construction, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home to 
be constructed by Copper State Construction. Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to Respondent 
at the Copper State Realty office. 
3. Pursuant to a December 2, 1987 earnest money sales agreement, Copper State 
Construction offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for $88,000. The offer provided 
\\)\' a $100 earnest money deposit, which had been received hy Mr. Lloyd, a S!-Mf,(* ca*J-
down payment and the possible assumption by Copper State Construction of the Stone's 
Seller to have the right to market and sell this property any time prior to 
completion of their new home located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek. 
This offer is null and void if property is sold to a third party prior to completion 
of seller's new home 
The offer further provided that if Copper State Construction was required to assume the 
Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside financing", Copper State Construction agreed 
to use best efforts to do so and the offer was made subject to Copper State Construction's 
"qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing". The offer 
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further recited that Copper State Construction agreed to apply to assume the underlying 
obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10) days after the Stone's acceptance of 
the offer. The offer also recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 1987. 
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the just-stated date is obviously in error, 
the parties intending the closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988. 
4. On December 28H987rthe StcmerffialJr?rcounter offer, whiclfprovidcd they 
would not be liable for any real estate commissions. On the just-stated date, the Stones and 
Respondent—as president of Copper State Construction-executed a December 10, 1987 
contract, whereby the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge Creek 
Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase a home to be constructed on that 
property by Copper State Construction. The contract price was $170,000 and the Stones 
made a $1,500 deposit toward payment on the contract. The just-stated contract was also 
subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home. Copper State Construction 
agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987 and complete construction within 
145 days from that date. 
5. The document used by the Stones and Copper Stale Construction with regard to the 
Stone's purchase of the new home was not the standard earnest money sales agreement form 
for residential construction. Rather, Respondent had obtained the form contract which he 
used from a friend who had—in turn—obtained it from an attorney. 
6. On December 29. 1987. Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Construction— 
accepted the Stone's counter offer. The Sinn earnest money had Nv- • ii-p^siied !»» the 
Copper State Realty trust account on December 21, 1987. The Stones relied on Copper State 
when they agreed to purchase the new home. Based on the credible evidence presented, the 
Stones believed if their condominium was not sold prior to completion of the construction on 
the new home, Copper State Construction would either assume the existing mortgage on the 
condominium or obtain other financing and~in either case-the Stones would no longer be 
obligated on the existing mortgage. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented, 
Respondent only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the existing loan, 
which would have been consistent with Copper State Construction's common and preferred 
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practice when it agreed to build a new home in trade for an existing residence. 
7. As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under what circumstances the 
existing mortgage on the condominium could be assumed. There is no substantial evidence 
either Mr. Lloyd or Respondent discussed that matter with the Stones at that time. There is 
also no substantial evidence Mr. Lloyd or Respondent ever made any inquiry of the lender at 
TfiaFUme whether the loan could bfe assumed or that Mr. Lloyd and Respondent discussed any 
possible assumption of the loan by Copper State Construction. 
8. In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Respondent as their new home was nearing 
completion. The Stone's condominium had not been sold by that time. The Stones thus 
requested Respondent to undertake efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium. 
Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent informed the Stones he had only 
intended to market their condominium for resale, he had only promised to make payments on 
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never intended to formally 
assume the existing loan to thus relieve the Stones from future liability for any payments on 
that loan. Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented. Respondent—on 
behai!Of Copper State Construction—contacted the lender on the mortgage lor the Stone's 
condominium and was informed Copper State Construction could not purchase the 
condominium on a simple assumption, due to an owner occupancy requirement. When 
Respondent subsequently offered to purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the 
Stones declined that offer. 
Vi. The Stones had sought financing from Crosslaiul Mortgage 'Vi'spany t«» purchase 
the new home. Approval of any such financing was contingent on the sale ol the Stone's 
terminating the contract to purchase ihe new home due to their inability to obtain financing. 
Copper State Construction could not formally assume the loan on the Stone's existing 
condominium nor was it ever Respondent's intent that Copper Sate Construction would do so. 
The Stones refused to sell their condominium to Copper State Construction on a simple 
assumption because it was never their intent to do so and they had initially agreed to sell the 
condominium with the understanding that only Copper State Construction would be thereafter 
obligated to make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on the 
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condominium. 
10. On July 26, 1988, the Stones thus demanded return of both the $1,500 deposit 
regarding the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State Construction had 
made respecting its' offer to purchase their condominium* The Stones also filed a complaint 
with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. On August 1, 1988, Respondent received a notice from 
theTSalt Lake Board of Realtorsi concerning that complaint Iniate Augosror early September 
1988, proceedings were conducted before a Board arbitration committee. On October 10, 
1988, the Stones and Copper State Construction reached an agreement, whereby the latter 
would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the 
$100 earnest money. On October 10, 1988, the Stones received a $1,500 check, signed by 
Respondent on behalf of Copper State Construction. When that check did not clear the bank, 
Respondent subsequently replaced it with a cashier's check. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11 provides a real licensee may be placed on probationary status, 
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is 
found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce; 
(15) violating or disregarding . . . the rules adopted by the 
commission and the division . . . . 
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when he lepre.Nented iu 
t i . . v « . , . ^ . . « » > . . t ( ' . . . < * . , . . , - 0 . . f > / " . . . , . . . . , - f . . . ^ . , . . . I . i . . . . . . . . . . . • ;• . . » . . . - . . , •• • •• 
the Stones relied on that representation in agreeing to purchase the new home from Copper 
State Construction and the latter did not assume-or apply to assume-the existing mortgage 
on the condominium. The Division further urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(2) 
when he made a false promise to the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume 
their mortgage and he did not intend to assume that mortgage, as allegedly evidenced by the 
provision in the earnest money sales agreement allowing for sale of the condominium to a 
third party before closing and Copper State Construction's alleged failure to ever apply to 
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assume the mortgage or obtain other financing to do so. 
Sections 61-2-11(1) and (2) provide that a substantial misrepresentation or false 
promise by a licensee may prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction. Utah courts have 
frequently set forth the elements of an intentional, or fraudulent, misrepresentation as follows: 
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient1knowIe3ge upon which to base" 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did 
in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage. 
Dugan vs. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1980); Nikkelson vs. Quail Valley Realty, Utah, 
641 P.2d 124, 126 (1982); Secor vs. Knight, Utah, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (1986); Conder vs. A. 
L Williams & Associates, Inc., Utah App., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (1987). Generally, intentional 
fraud requires proof of an intent to deceive. Significantly, it has been recognized such intent 
may be inferred if a misrepresentation is "voluntarily communicated to the victim with 
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that the 
victim is likely to relv on it", (ialloway vs. AFCO Development Corp., Utah App., 777 P.2d 
506,509(1989). 
It is well settled that a "promise of future performance, when made with a present 
intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise, 
constitutes actionable deceit and fraud." Von Hake vs. Thomas, Utah. 705 P.2d 766. 770 
(1()S5). In essence, a fraudulent misrepresentation «>r a "false promise", as that language i< 
used in Section 61-2-11(2), exists if a promise is made without a present intent to perform as 
p;v-;v,:\cJ. (,.;//. .•..;*. \". .';/-( (J i }i'\'t'!upr,:cn; ( -•//>. s;;p;'a: iU'rkt .< v /•;,:;;;, jar (
 tntp, /.;;/•». * 
vs. Meibos. Utah. 607 I\2d 79N. <S()5 (I9ISU). In other words, the promisor must have had a 
"preconceived intention not to perform the promises made." Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., IS 
Utah2d 135, 138, 417 P.2d 643 (1966). The mere fact a "promisor failed to perform his 
promise" is not sufficient to establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow vs. Guardtone, 
Inc., supra. 
Since the falsity of a promise is reflected by the present intent of the promisor not to 
perform as promised, such alleged conduct necessarily involves proof of such an intent to 
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deceive. Given the foregoing, and with particular regard to the facts of this case, the initial 
inquiry is whether Respondent-acting as either an agent or on his own account-made a false 
promise to the Stones with regard to whether Copper State Construction would assume the 
existing mortgage on their condominium. It is evident the Stones and Respondent shared no 
common intent and had no joint understanding that Copper State Construction would formally 
-assume Ihe «xigtog-iBeitgage4ft<^«estion.^Therc is^o-«ubstaRUal^ vkieiK -^Re&pottdexiU 
either directly or through Mr. Lloyd-made any representation or promise to the Stones 
regarding the manner by which Copper State Construction could or would assume that loan. 
Further, the earnest money sales agreement does not clearly reflect whether Copper State 
Construction's possible assumption of the loan would occur through either a formal or simple 
assumption. 
Significantly, the earnest money sales agreement expressly allowed the Stones to 
market and sell their condominium to a third party prior to the completion of a new home. It 
is obvious both the Stones and Respondent anticipated that possibility for approximately five 
months and Respondent likely hoped the condominium would be sold to a third party before 
it became necessary for Copper State Construction to assume the loan. When it became clear 
no sale to a third party would be realized, the Stones contacted Respondent and the latter then 
inquired of the lender as to whether the loan was assumable. 
. Nevertheless, Respondent~on behalf of Copper State Construction—had promised to 
assume the loan without knowledge at that time whether Copper State Construction could do 
»^> on a simple assumption. When Conner State Construction offered to purchase the 
condominium, Respondent did not know under what—if any—circumstances the loan could be 
.:\si:n:e.:. Siive. Key •••;;!. :\\ :.:\J: ..:*. .:v: .v..:.. \ ........:.>:. v.--:U! -:.;•. ^.N;!::, ihc :•*:.. 
by a simple assumption, it was incumbent on Respondent to only make such a promise if he 
knew Copper State Construction could do so. 
Under those circumstances, Respondent recklessly represented to the Stones that 
Copper State Construction would purchase the condominium and possibly assume their loan 
on a simple assumption without sufficient knowledge on which to base that representation. 
Thus, Respondent made a false promise that Copper State Construction would assume the 
loan on the condominium by a simple assumption, he had insufficient knowledge upon which 
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to promise such action since he did not know whether Copper State Construction could so 
assume that loan and the promise was made for the purpose of inducing the Stones to 
purchase a new home to be built by Copper State Construction. Further, the Stones acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the condominium could be assumed by 
Copper State Construction, the Stones relied on the false promise made by Respondent and 
they were thereby induced to act to-thcirinjory and damage. Respondent' thus violated"— » 
Section 61-2-11(2). 
The Division next asserts Respondent violated or disregarded R174-4.2.7.4, which 
provides: 
In the event a dispute arises over the return or forfeiture of the earnest 
money and/or other trust funds, and no party has filed a civil suit arising 
out of the transaction, the principal broker must, within fifteen (15) days 
of notice of the dispute, provide the parties written notice of the dispute 
and request them to meet to arbitrate the matter. The principal broker 
holding the earnest money and/or trust funds must act as arbitrator. In the 
event the dispute is not resolved in the arbitration attempt, the principal 
broker must, within forty-five (45) days of the date on which the principal 
broker mailed or delivered to both parties notice of the dispute, interplead 
the disputed funds into the court of appiopriate jurisdiction A cop\ of the 
interpleader action must be retained in the principal broker's files until 
final disbursement of funds. 
The Stones notified Respondent on July 26, 1988 of the dispute regarding both the $1,500 
deposit concerning the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State 
Construction had made respecting its offer to purchase then condominium. Pursuant to the 
just-quoted uile. Respondent would have had fifteen (15) iLw **i.»m that date to proxidc the 
v
" ' ' :\ S\.v (Y-v unci!* i w;i!i .\ii:;cn ;••»:.c \r : . . v \ 
meet to ,iiniu;iic me mattei. The ruie. it sinctiv applied a.v'u:::^ io its icim.s. v.mnu nave 
also required Respondent to arbitrate the dispute. 
Concededly, Respondent provided no written notice to the Stones and Copper State 
Construction of the dispute and he did not request them to meet to arbitrate that matter. 
Nevertheless, the Court duly notes Respondent's status as the president of Copper State 
Construction. Under those circumstances, it would have been a clear conflict of interest for 
Respondent to have arbitrated any dispute between the Stones and Copper State Construction. 
Significandy, an arbitration proceeding was conducted before the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
14 
within approximately five (5) weeks after the Stones notified Respondent of the dispute. 
Although there is no evidence Respondent took any action to initiate that proceeding and he 
did not arbitrate the dispute, he should be excused from strict compliance with that 
requirement of the rule. 
R174-4.2.7.4 also requires that if the dispute is not resolved in an arbitration attempt 
inducted withiiLfbrjy-friEe. (45) days from the date tfrj» principal frrokqr mailed c^eUyered^ 
to both parties notice of the dispute, the principal broker shall interplead the disputed funds 
into a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Over forty-five (45) days lapsed from the time the 
Stones notified Respondent of the dispute until the Stones and Copper State Construction had 
resolved the matter by agreement. While it is not clear from this record whether the 
resolution of their dispute was a product of that arbitration proceeding or a separate 
agreement between the Stones and Copper State Construction, the Court duly notes the unique 
circumstances of this case. Based thereon, the Court is not persuaded R 174-4.2.7.4 should be 
rigidly applied as to conclude Respondent has violated that rule. Thus, the Division's 
assertion in that regard is without merit. 
Finally, the Division asserts the contract which Respondent used to clTcct both the sale 
of real property to the Stones and their purchase of a new residence was not the standard 
earnest money sales agreement for residential construction approved for use by licensees. 
The Division thus urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-20 and, as a consequence thereof. 
Section 61-2-12(15). 
Section M-2-20 provides: 
Ren! estate licensees mav fill out those forms annroveri hy the Utah 
ov M U I U I C . w i i n ttic i o n u w m i : c.\Ccjn!i»ii.v 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any 
documents associated with the closing of a 
real estate transaction; 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared 
by legal counsel of the buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any 
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and 
attorney general have not approved a specific form necessary 
to that transaction. 
Respondent admits he did not use the specific real estate form, approved by the Commission 
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and attorney general, to effect the Stone's purchase of the new home. However, Respondent 
urges Section 61-2-10 does not apply because he did not prepare the contract as a licensee or 
on behalf of Copper State Realty, but solely on behalf of Copper State Construction and that 
Copper State Realty was not involved in that transaction. 
No proper basis exists to view the two transactions between the Stones and Copper 
•—-State-Construction-as-distinct and unrelated. -MoreoyerrSection 6KWl~can apply whether 
Respondent acted in either his capacity as a licensee or on his own account By analogy, 
Section 61-2-20 should also apply under either circumstance in this case, even though 
Respondent was acting as the president of Copper State Construction when he prepared and 
used the contract in question. Consequently, Respondent violated Section 61-2-2(20) and a 
further basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect to Respondent's license to 
practice as a real estate principal broker. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
The recommended disciplinary action with respect to Counts VI-VIII in this case is 
addressed below, in conjunction with the findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to 
Case No. RES9-03-12, which was heard on a consolidated basis in this proceeding. 
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Case No. RE89-03-12 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph 1 of Case No. RE87-11-19 
Tactual Statement II) are incorporated herein by reference. 
2. As of January 1988rJames and Valerie faster owned a house located at 7588-
Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah. Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters 
had listed that property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales agent. Based on 
the credible evidence presented, Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Respondent in late 1987 and 
she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home for another residence. Mrs. 
Gaster also contacted Ms. Hill-Black about a possible trade of properties in that regard. 
3. Based on the more credible evidence presented, Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by 
Copper State Realty and he specifically contacted Respondent to inquire about a trade of the 
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Respondent in late January or early 
February 1988 and Respondent saw the Gaster home, which was available for sale by owner 
at that time. Ms. Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new home, located at 
358 l£. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by Copper State Construction. 
4. On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property 
from Copper State Construction for $189,000. Ms. Hill-Black, who was affiliated with Gump 
& Ayers Real Estate Inc., represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales 
agreement, which provided the Gasiers W.HJIJ apply lor tinaneiiv' i!-'. »u»?h r-.wO.-md 
Mortgage Corporation. 
home for SIU2.0UU. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Ms. Hili-Black 
prepared that earnest money sales agreement at Respondent's direction, but it was Respondent 
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction. Respondent, acting as principal 
broker for Copper State Realty, receipted the earnest money deposit on that offer and he 
signed the offer in his capacity as president of Copper State Construction. 
6. The just-described offer, which provided Copper State Construction would assume 
the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was also made subject to the following 
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conditions: 
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any time prior to 
completion of home located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold 
prior to completion of buyer's new home, this offer is null & void. 
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer. Five days later, the Gasters entered 
into a listing agreement with Copper State Realty, whereby the Dover Hill Drive orooertv was 
listed for sale at $94,000. 
7. Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed on iviarcn i J, i?oo, 
whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced 
to $94,000 and $181,000, respectively. The sale of each property was scheduled to close on 
April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage 
Corporation to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property. Proof of the Gaster's sale of their 
home was a necessary condition to the financing on their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane 
property. 
8. The closing on each transaction was conducted on April 21, 1988. Respondent, Ms. 
Hill-Black and the Gasters were among those present at that time. Respondent signed the 
closing statements as president of Copper State Construction. Both Gump A: Ayers Real 
Estate Inc. and Copper State Realty shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane 
property. Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to Copper State Construction, whereby the 
latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed with a current principle balance ol 
SN2.9X.S.24 in favor of a Dean C. Burnham ami Charlotte I.. Bees«»n. Copies \)\ the settlement 
statement and the warranty deed on the sale o\ the Dover Dill Drive property were submitted 
v. orpuiation c io.se u the loan on me vjasin \ I ' I I I U I . I V »»i m. miuu -v. JIK Lane jnupei i \ m 
reliance on those documents. 
#9\Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Respondent reasonably 
believed Copper State Construction would be able to make the necessary payments when 
Copper State Construction purchased the Dover Hill Drive property. However, several homes 
which Copper State Construction had contracted to build were not timely completed between 
sometime in April 1988 through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes 
were delayed or did not occur during that time. Consequently, Copper State Construction 
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lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the Dover Hill Drive property. 
10. Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three liens were filed on the 
Bridlewalk Lane property by subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and 
materials provided during the construction of that house. Specifically, a $244 lien was filed 
sometime in April 1988 for garage doors which had been installed. This record does not 
reflect-exactly when that lien was filecL A..$4,133 lien was filed, on April 2?., ,l98&ior — 
materials provided by Jordan Home Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for 
labor and materials provided by Prows Plastering. Respondent did not inform the Gasters at 
closing that any subcontractors or materialmen had not been paid. Copper State Construction 
subsequendy made payments to satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not 
reflect when those payments were made. 
11. Copper State Construction's first payment on the trust deed note was due June 1, 
1988. Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no payment had been made. The 
latter then inquired of Respondent, who indicated the payment had been made, but not 
properly credited. Beyond Respondent's self-serving testimony, there is no substantial 
evidence any such payment was made. Approximately one month later. Mr. (iaster became 
aware still no payments had been made. Mr. Gaster then contacted Respondent, who 
indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments. 
12. On September 4. 1988, a notice of default was recorded which reflected a $4,705 
delinquency for non-payment from June through September 1988. On February 7. 1989. 
notice was i^ vaed of a trustee sale to be conducted wit'1 v°.vc' !•• the P r •»' H«'t i^'ve 
properly. The Gasicrs subsequently paid $8,75U to relinquish all claims and avoid loreclo.sure 
CONCLUSIONS Ol: LAW 
Section 61-2-11 provides a real estate licensee may be placed on probationary status, 
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is 
found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce; 
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(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker . . . 
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal 
in a real estate transaction. 
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when: (1) he 
represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would purchase the Dover Hill 
Drive property and assume the obligation on that property; (2) the Gasters relied on those 
representations when they agreed to purchase the Bridlewalk property from Copper State 
Construction; (3) Crossland Mortgage Corporation also relied on those representations when it 
granted a loan to the Gasters for the just-referenced purchase; (4) Respondent knew or should 
have known Copper State Construction would not be able to make the necessary payments on 
the Dover Hill Drive property; and (5) Copper State Construction failed to make any 
payments on the trust deed with respect to that property. 
Concededly, Respondent became aware of Copper State Construction's perilous 
financial condition shortly after the April 21, 1988 closing on its purchase of the Caster's 
home. Further. Copper State Construction made no payments with respect to the existing 
trust deed on that property. However, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude 
Respondent-acting on behalf of Copper State Construction-promised to make the necessary 
payments on the Gater's home with an existing intent not to so perform. As previously 
noted, the mere fact that "a promisor failed to perform his promise" is not sufficient to 
establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow v. Guurdtone, Inc.. supra. Impoitaniiv iheie 
is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent knew or should have known Copper State 
Co-Txtri: ' - , *\.»i:»i! ' ^ "° . :,N!% :o •*-. .e *!iove ; \ i \ ' , v p . > v ! v i ("«» » v* v ' • • *• 
a u i c c u tn uu MI. u i \ e n liic MMCUOIMI:. UIC Divis ion .s JNSCIIIUIIN UIJI i\e*\pniivieiu \ i» ' i . r . .: 
Sections 61-2-11(1) or (2) in those respects is without merit. 
However, Respondent's failure to disclose to the Gasters that subcontractors and 
materialmen had not been paid constitutes a misrepresentation by omission. Based on the 
evidence presented, that misrepresentation was intentionally made and was also substantial, 
within the meaning of Section 61-2-11(1). Whether it is a common occurrence for 
outstanding amounts to be owed for materials and labor provided as to the construction of a 
new home at the time the sale of that home is closed, Respondent should have advised the 
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Gasters if any such indebtedness existed at the time of closing. His failure to do so 
constitutes a violation of Section 61-2-11(1). Fortunately, Copper State Construction 
subsequently made payment to satisfy the liens which had been filed on the Gaster's home. 
The Division next asserts Respondent is either unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public. The Court 
initially notesj^r. Gaster contacted Respondent sometime in June 1988 and inquired why 
Copper State Construction had made no payment with respect to the trust deed. Respondent's 
subsequent conduct is seriously disturbing in certain respects. Other than his mere assurance 
to Mr. Gaster that the June 1988 payment had been made, there is no evidence Respondent 
then exercised any reasonable diligence to insure the payment was made and properly credited 
as to protect the Gasters' interests. Respondent was also aware of Copper State 
Construction's mounting cash flow problems at that time, yet he neglected to disclose that 
fact to Mr. Gaster. 
Although Respondent later told Mr. Gaster he would try to make the necessary 
payments as to the trust deed, Respondent had no reasonable basis to believe he could do $>o. 
Further, Respondent still failed to inform the Gasters of Copper State Construction's 
deteriorating financial condition. Since Copper State Construction did not formally assume 
the existing indebtedness on the Dover Hill Drive property and the Gasters would thus be 
obligated to make timely payment in satisfaction of the trust deed if Copper State 
Construction failed to do so. Respondent should have kept the Gasters fully informed as to 
anv difficulties which Copper Stan' Cuisirvnor. .MVOUU: M.*J in making tunelv pavment ot" 
that monthly obligation. Respondent\s failure to do .so icquiicd the Gaster.s to subsequent!) 
Respondent's misconduct icflects an mexcusjoie tailure to protect the Gasters' interests. He 
has thus violated Section 61-2-11(8) and a proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction 
in that regard. 
Finally, the Division asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-12(16) when he 
allegedly breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Gasters in the transaction under review. 
Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent was the agent for 
the Gasters with regard to Copper State Construction's purchase of the Gaster's home. 
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Respondent thus owed the Gasters a fiduciary duty to act in their best interest. Respondent 
breached that duty when he represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would 
make the necessary payments on the trust deed, but no such payments were subsequently 
made. 
A considered review of Respondent's conduct with regard to the transactions involving 
4he-Stonesand the~Gasters reveals numerous instances when he violated those statutes and/or 
rules which govern the conduct of principal brokers and sales agents in this state. 
Respondent's repeated failure to adequately protect the interests of the Stones and the Gasters 
was often coupled with his consistent efforts to further either his own interests or those of 
Copper State Construction. Simply put, Respondent did not act in an honest and ethical 
manner and he failed to properly discharge his duties as a licensee. Respondent's multiple 
instances of unprofessional conduct warrant entry of an appropriate disciplinary sanction to 
thus adequately protect the public health, safety and welfare. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
principal broker be revoked, said revocation to become e!tecti\r as piovided bv -Section 61-2-
12(2)(c)(i). 
Dated this / ^ ^ d a y of March, 1992. 
EkflHUl 
A(Jministraii\c Law JIUILC 
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ORDER 
Of RANDY R. KRANTZ to Act CASE NO. RE87-11-19 
as a Real Estate Broker CASE NO. RE89-03-12 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Orders on the above-referenced cases are hereby 
confirmed and adopted. The license of Randy R. Krantz to act as a 
real estate licensee is hereby revoked, effective O LU^ & o , 
]QQr!. It :s fmtrho? oidoiod that ho may not apply foi a now 
license ioi al 1<\J:;( I hi ^ o yotns; howevi : , no pi<jmi.»c d. i;uo'» t lur 
a new license will be granted upon a future application. 
DATED this %-tiu day of A p n L , 1992. 





St-MONS, JR H 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
— «a-vs/"tfie undersigned 
T T ordeTls-3SHH-rma-a^ a p p r o v e d I b y t h ^
 1 9 9 2 . The aboye^ Order xs^ ^  ^ £ 
this x - — 
BLAINE E . i i W J - ^ T c.crraTF DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
ADDENDUM " B " 
BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the License ORDER . 
of RANDY R. KRANTZ to Act CASE NO. RE87-11-19 
as a Real Estate Broker CASE NO. RE89-03-12 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Orders on the above-referenced cases are hereby 
confirmed and adopted. The license of Randy R. Krantz to act as a 
real estate licensee is hereby "revoked,-effective" O U ^ ' o * 
1992. ~ It-'is further ordered that * he may not-apply for a new 
license for at least three years; however,-no promise is made that 
a^new license will be granted upon a future application. 
DATED this %-rtu day of Aftc\ i , 1992. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE^ COMMISSION 
/ // S/U/ /! 
i cc^Jy I U<.-a.^L'L/> JL-/. / <"t .LA 1 it is 
PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER 
BETH TOLBERT 
siatoNs, J R - T i 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY (J 
confirmed and aoDroved by the undersigned 
of (ffiAcf , 1992. 
BLAINE E.PrWITCHELL, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
ADDENDUM "C" 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE : ORDER ON REVIEW 
OF RANDY KRANTZ TO ACT AS A : CASE NO. RE87-11-19 
REAL ESTATE PRINCIPAL BROKER : CASE NO. RE89-03-12 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a review, upon the request of Randy Krantz 
("Respondent") of a decision of the Real Estate Commission (the 
"Commission") and the Division of Real Estate of the Department: of 
Commerce (the "Division"), dated April 8, 1992, which revoked 
Respondent's license to act as a Real Estate Broker. The Order was 
the result of consolidation of the two above-referenced cases. 
There was no oral argument in connection with this review, and 
Respondent represented himself during the review process. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
Respondent did not clearly identify those facts from the 
Order's Findings of Facts which he disputes on appeal. From 
Respondent's lengthy narrative supporting his request for review, 
the issues can be summarized as follows: 
1. Whether the Board's and Division's Orders are supported 
by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and 
2. Whether the length of time which passed between filing 
the petitions, and issuing the Order, prejudices Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission and the 
Division are adopted for purposes of this Review. They are 
lengthy, and will not be repeated herein. With respect to Case No. 
RE 87-11-19, a portion of the Complaint was dismissed, as the Order 
concluded that the Division had not met its burden of proof with 
respect to the complaint involving the Velez's. Respondent does 
not appeal that portion of the Order, and, consequently, it is not 
reviewed herein. 
2. Respondent offered his version of events in his request 
for review. However, he did not clearly indicate which Findings of 
Fact he believed to be incorrect or unsupported by the evidence. 
It appears that Respondent was, in the request for review, 
repeating the evidence he presented at the hearing. The Board and 
the Administrative Law Judge were present, heard the testimony of 
both sides, and weighed the evidence. Respondents' repeating his 
evidence in the request for review does not constitute sufficient 
grounds to overturn the Findings of Fact. For any findings to be 
overturned on review, Respondent would need to show how a finding 
of fact was made erroneously, or was not based on the evidence 
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presented, and show how his version of the facts was supported by 
the evidence. 
3. Finally, much of Respondent's assertions in the request 
for review, even if true, would not materially change the outcome. 
In Case No. RE87-11-19, the Order was based on a finding that 
Respondent made a sub3iaLntia*^ wfcS^ f^es6ntati.o'r The fact 
supporting this finding was primarily that Respondent had offered 
to assume the Stones' loan, and that such promise was made 
recklessly because Respondent did not know whether or not he would 
be able to assume the loan, or disregarded evidence that he would 
not be able to do so. Respondent, in his request for review, does 
not dispute that he offered to assume the loan. Nor does he 
dispute that his company was in serious financial difficulty at the 
time. 
4. The Order also was based on the fact that Respondent used 
a f^y-m not- annrnvpH hv the Division, in connection with the 
contract which Respondent used to effect the sale of property to 
the Stones and the Stones' purchase of a new home. Respondent does 
not dispute that the form was unauthorized, but asserts that 
authorization was not required because the transaction was on 
behalf of Copper State Construction, rather than Copper State 
Realty, and the two entities were not related. Thus, the Finding 
of Facts on this point -- that Copper State Construction entered 
into an agreement to purchase the'Stone's existing home, as well as 
a second agreement to sell another home to the Stones, and neither 
form was approved by the Division — is upheld; the legal 
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consequence of this Finding (whether Copper State Construction is 
"related" to Copper State Realty and, thus, approval was required 
-- is discussed below, in the Conclusions of Law. 
5. In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the Order was based on a finding 
that Respondent had £^i^j^Jfc^di s c1 a? e existing liens and potential 
liens against the home sold to the Gasters, and had^failed to, 
ciiscl^e C^fcpper State Construction's financial problems to the 
Gasters, at a time when it had undertaken certain financial 
obligations and was unlikely to be able to meet them. Again, as 
before, Respondent reasserts his version of events without 
specifically showing how the Findings of Fact were incorrect. 
Indeed, Respondent acknowledges the existing liens on the Gaster's 
home, and that suppliers had not been paid at the time of closing. 
6. The other key finding of fact in that Order was that 
Respondent had been acting in the capacity of an "^ gig&fc>& for the 
Gasters, thereby owing them a fj^^^T^rfl^ti\/ Respondent appears 
to assert that he was not in fact the Gasters' agent, because 
Copper State Realty had no listing agreement with the Gasters to 
sell their old home, and a commission was not charged. The request 
for review acknowledges that Respondent inspected the Gaster's old 
home; discussed with the Gasters the possible purchase of the home 
by Copper State Construction; allowed an earnest money agreement to 
be prepared which showed that Copper State Realty would deposit 
money into its trust account; that Copper State Construction was to 
make payments on its purchase of the Gaster's old home; that 
Respondent was making decisions as to whether or not to rent the 
-4-
old home ("we believed the home to be more marketable if it was 
vacant"); and that Copper State Construction "intended to sell this 
home". It is impossible to find, given these facts and 
circumstances, that Respondent did not act as an agent for the 
Gasters. Whether or not he believed he was an agent, certainly the 
Gasters were entitled to believe that he was their agent, acting on 
their behalf, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In Case No. 87-11-19, the finding that Respondent made a 
substantial misrepresentation in his promise to assume the Stones' 
loan constitute sufficient evidence to find that Respondent 
violated §61-2-11(1) . 
2. In Case No. 87-11-19, the Conclusions of Law also found 
that Respondent used a form not approved by the Division, in 
violation of 61-2-20, and that this constituted grounds for action 
against Respondent's license under §61-2-12(15) (which is 
apparently a misprint, and should be §61-2-11(15)). That portion 
of the Order also references §61-2-10, making it unlawful for an 
agent to accept consideration from anyone other than his principal 
broker. Respondent asserts that Copper State Realty and Copper 
State Construction were not related, and that one could not 
possibly know about the financial condition of the other. 
Respondent was President and director of Copper State Construction. 
His wife was owner of 50% of the shares. In light of this, his 
statement that, since he was not an owner of Copper State 
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Construction he did not know of its financial problems is plainly 
without merit. And, in light of the fact that Respondent was 
principal broker for Copper State Realty, the conclusions that the 
transactions were related and should have been evidenced by use of 
a form approved by the division are upheld. 
3. In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the failure to disclose existing 
liens and unpaid debts constituted substantial misrepresentations 
under the circumstances, and the Conclusions of Law that Respondent 
violated. §61-2-11(1) are upheld. Similarly, Respondent violated 
the fiduciary duty he had to the Gasters to disclose the financial 
problems of Copper State Construction. The original conclusion 
that his failure to do so constitutes a violation of §61-2-11(8) 
and §61-2-11(16) is upheld. 
4. With respect to whether delay between filing the 
Petitions and issuing the Order should constitute grounds for 
overturning the Order, the key length of time is the approximately 
nine months which elapsed between the date of the hearing (May 2 9 
and 30, 1991) and the date of the order (April 8, 1992). The 
original petitions were filed during August of 1989 and 
consolidated shortly thereafter so as to be heard in one hearing. 
Respondent originally defaulted, having failed to answer, and was 
granted an extension of time by the Administrative Law Judge to 
answer the Petition. Respondent also moved for summary judgement 
during the interim before the hearing, and certain settlement 
negotiations occurred, which also cause delay in the petitions' 
being heard. The Recommended Order was prepared on March 18, 1992, 
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and adopted by the Commission -- which typically meets only once a 
month — on April 8. Respondent is understandably unsatisfied with 
the delays in this case. Some of them were at his behest. There 
cannot be an absolute time of delay between a hearing and issuance 
of an order which can be held to be both unreasonable and injurious 
to Respondent. Although it is unfortunate, it is not clearly 
unreasonable, given that the case involved two separate petitions, 
which between them set out three different factual situations. The 
hearing consumed two days and there evidently were a large number 
of witnesses and abundant documentary evidence to consider. There 
was no formal restriction on Respondent's practice during the 
pendency of these matters. Therefore, the delay was not so 
unreasonable or so injurious to Respondent as to require 
overturning the Order. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
The Order in this case is upheld. Pursuant to Department Rule 
151-46b-12 (B) , the effective date of that order is now ten (10) 
days after the date this Order on Review has been mailed to all 
parties, or June^> , 1992. 
Dated this ^ / day of June, 1992. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the ^^^ day of June 1992 I caused to 
be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, 




2216 East Lauri Kay Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Nicholas E, Hales 
Woodbury, Jensen, Kesler & Swinton 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
Blaine E. Twitchell, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
P.O Box 45806 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0806 
Robert Steed, Assistant A.G. 
Beneficial Life Tower 
11th Floor 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM " E " 
— — EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREED IT 
Yes(X) No(0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: 
1 c,n/^ V. .nJ ^jtctio fc.Q-gjjtcr 
+ 
lersigned Buyer J O * » »f  * * • *t K 3 v i j i i f t i_^ i . v^ LA , A ^ - f hereby deposits with Brokerage 
EST MONEY, the amount of ( f ''-/{/ *&U C/H V.1 -( iVc^l , ,i j [r c J S^~ ""v% Dollars ($ \tf-( J , 
nof f( r -, it >t ITC*CK«
 r W ^ / , r , . J / J J y^/^t^z^A^^ 
ill be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. / - "t ^ - - r i ^ ' « - * - ' L - A 
fr\>KyX£ ^ ^ ' ? 4 Received by A 'J ' fe*Z& 
Pnone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
3PERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 
JLu^lUUli)^ in the City of /1 lU f fa^j County of J<*H-f L / i k ^ , Utah, 
[o any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
nee with Section G. Said property is owned by. JL2 as sellers, and is more particularly described 
LiUZ X H* ' li r 
)K APPLICABLE BOXES: 
INIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Vacant Lot • Vacant Acreage • Other 
IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial [-^Residential D Condo D Other 
Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property, 
e following personal property shaH also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: ''./- / ^  i l* LJ* i 
i Excluded Items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale: * 
) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price: 
public sewer Unconnected 0Q- well G3 connected GPother Qrelectricity [^connected 
septic tank Crconnected Q irrigation water / secondary system G i ingress & egress by private easement 
other sapitary system # of shares Company Grdedicated road [Zrpaved 
>ublic water CJ connected dfcv antenna Bmaster antenna Zrprewired C-Surb and gutter 
-private water Unconnected BSnatural gas [^connected B-Pother rights 
d) Survey. A certified survey C_fthall be furnished at the expense of prior to closing, [2SshaJl not be furnished. 
e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
widition, except: t'-Jftr \C pL C t C < j)l U j U I IU j n t U , p \j C \ c C ' l O O U l f l i«. C \ H - ql 11 C f j f C f 767 J 
» 
PURCHASE PRICE ANDj|NANCINeHRhe4QtaJ^rchase price for the property is V- > O ' ^ » k j fc JC I j / \\X j I Hi K-TvJ f U tzC'tl ( J "~ 
^ Dollars ($ *' 'J ^  ^  ) which shall be paid as follows: 
which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
/ - / • ™ • 




which include: • principal; • interest; • taxes; • insurance; • condo fees; • other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: D principal; • interest; • taxes; • insurance; • condo fees; • other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or, seller financing, to be paid as follows: l / * 
11 j i V i •" -'- • •* i J L *>-4 j . . » l a / ' j * - * **''« - - * J> '• < k ij~'{ji-> 
Other 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
i assume and/or procure same and fois offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees 
> make application within days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
n interest rate not to exceed %. If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within ~JA^ days after Seller's acceptance 
f this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon wrjjten notice. Seller agrees to pay up to ' ^ ~ mortgage loan discount 
-««•« not to exceed $ _J . In addition, seller agrees to pay $ " to be used for Buyer's other loan costs. 
.... .-fc. owe Tesents that Seller f^holds title to the property in fe< ^ttple DTs purchasing the property under a real 
estate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest sha.. ^ made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnisi. _ od and marketable title to the property, sybject 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein*, evidenced by BJ-a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price &an abstract of title brought current, 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H). 
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to, 
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions, (CC & R's). Buyer Q r 
1r* <J 5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:. 
i title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall tak© title 
\ has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
<d-
6./SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: 
±i nt^>. taint JLA w , ; / ; y> vy 
ion 6 shall be limited to the following: _ 
contained in section c, the following ite s 
uJ.L/jy !</•> Jam 
cuiL-iiz -:///•*-&-tci 
'deceptions to the above and Section 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
to dosing:^' ' ' s J'/ ' " / - * I-•, / ' - - / ' -<-'•' f i'< , / /'If ',.//'ifil 
irfil /, t. 8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before ,19 2. at a reasonable location to be designated by 
tiler, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow' closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
s Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of -, Qntete of possession Opiate of closing • other 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on * h unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the, signing of this Agreement the listing agent represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 
i the selling agent 
-tern /• . represents ( ) Seller ( X Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
tten disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials O i ^ ( - \ ^ Seller's initials. 
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BE^N 
5EPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
2. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
9 until J- :C \ fflbNPM) rcjj- J&j , 19 ZO
 r to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARk LST 
YEY 
V ^ < .- d. -i - l\iC r — 
rsigoatike) ~~7 ~ ~~t 




•"'JMtxi A JS\ 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
er's Signature) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CKONE / 
VCCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
REJECTION. Selle.r hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
JOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEP the foregoing offer SUBJECTJTO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
(AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms sents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until. 
cified below. 
if^JcukJju C^rv<Mi^u-^<^^ 
's Signature) ^ (Date) 
! « . . <t" 
(Time) 
.QQ ?r\ £-<?-«&£ ^35 
(Address) 




(Date) (Time) (Address) s Signature) 
CONE: 
CEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
JECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
UNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
; Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
^-acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
_ SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
^ ^ 3 • * * • & 
!EOF SELLER fj y ~Y <' 
Date 
Date 
I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the • Seller • Buyer. Sent by 




EARNES MONEY SALES AGREE ENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 




INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
v and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
[s)t fencing, trees and shrubs. 
3. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
id inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
2. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
will not be remedied prior to dosing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
3 brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
itisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
ontinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
las no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shad become null and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defects) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prioi 
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objectk>n(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new lease; 
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants 
tas or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
md all pnor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
lent This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wnting and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
Dt expressly modified or excluded therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
tyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
iuding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
:abie law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
pleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
nest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bnnging the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
5 incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
' ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
b) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in wnting to repair or replace damaged property 
to closing or declare this Agreement null and void if damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in wnting to repair 
place and does actually repair and replace damaged property pnor to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be dosed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, stnkes, 
lood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
s of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
red by all parties to the transaction 
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (te) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing 
surance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and intciest 
umed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
ing 
EAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
ing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
contract therein 
ITICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
vent with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
latically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf ef the 
r the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
OKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
fS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
)UR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
I HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THP ncci/^ 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER (/) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the I 1 < day ot '. 19 * between^ L L-.— 
. >, / / / , / , > , y l ' H F
 aghnypr(.) and C(,\>p( *~ A (.tkM '( / flC< ft - t r , f ? C f 1 asseller(s) 
covering realjDroperty descjibed as follows 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
/ 
I (Ijrfjuf J///(/&/r-<L> '/-I-1- ,
 tJ 
J 1/A. ,/f* tf-f '.< 
/ * J 
31*11$ ^ l,% ,# * *"" ' ; ' 
/ 
/ ' / / / ' J < L • ^ ' 
/ * / • / / / '/-/-* 
/ 
t * . / * » .
 f /.. t / i J 
• 
// 'of-c * 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until ( A M / P M ) 
19 to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date v, ~* I V ,'. ! Signature of ( \Seller (\() Buyer 
Time fi ' ( (AM/fPfA) - ^ > , 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
(^ ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
^SLS> 5 ^ O ^ 1 ^ 
I * Signature J Signature s\ Date Time 
{ ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
fc^Vw^t-^ s ~v% £ fcS%-<!x^-^r— 2 - VSfc 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of Seller(s) Date 
{ ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
ADHENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER const.tutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER fl() an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the f' *) day of F(. L!"'-rlry, ™?X_ between ~^^SV' 
( ii kj \ jitu^A- <££•&. Qs buyer(s), and ^C J -j <• i' - "'/ / A - * '-' ' / ^ / A £ J&^f 
covering real property described as follows _ , , / . . , , i . / 
* i£ £ . Lf iJk, <, OIKbf*- /.',< rrn\t.(Lfah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
I. PAM.JU to M< $\%\>QQQ'<ro 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( \ ) Buyer shall have until f)'.GC5 ( A M / P M ) 
to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date 3 " I S ' " t O Signatu?e of (^) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Time 2 *2>Q (AM/PM) SJ^^C^j f. KA^^^Z K^UX^„ 
^Afpe* iMcJjt tt&^A ,
 fL.w . 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
^ N ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TJO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
Signature ^ Signature " Date Time 
( Y J hejjeby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ^) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all suftiatures /"* i / _ x /•> 
I ^Signature of Seller(s) Signature of Buyer(s) Date | ^Signature of Seller(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
ADDENDUM "F" 
...w.^w-i oMLtb AGREEMENT 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATF 2 Dec 1987 
he undersigned Buyer C o p p e r S t a t e C o n s t r u c t i o n hereby deposits with Brokerage 
EARNEST MONEY, the amount of O n e h u n d r e d S T l o / 1 0 0 Dollars ($ - 0 0 * 0 0 ) 
ie form ofRuyer's check to be deposited upon acceptance of th i s offer. 
:h shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law 
ppper State Realty 263-3102 .
 ReCe.vedby 
cerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 
86 W_ Central Park Cir .m the c.ty of Taylorsvil le county of Salt Lake
 utahf 
ct to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
dance with Section G Said property is owned by R o b e r t G P e g g y S t o n e as sellers, and is more particularly described 
27th Street Condo
 fc 
ECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Vacant Lot • Vacant Acreage • Other _ _ 
IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial • Residential 3 Condo • Other 
) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
ie following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title J_C_ie 
l Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale N o n e 
CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
>ublic sewer 3 connected D well • connected D other Q electricity Unconnected 
eptic tank • connected • irrigation water / secondary system • ingress & egress by private easement 
ther sanitary system # of shares Company __ dedicated road C_t paved 
ublic water CXconnected Q TV antenna • master antenna • prewired S curb and gutter 
rivate water • connected S3 natural gas __ connected D other rights 
Survey. A certified survey D shall be furnished at the expense of prior to closing, QC shall not be furnished 
3uyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
Jition, except , 
CHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is E i g h t y - e i g h t T h o u s a n d __ _ 
_ Dollars ($ 8 8 ^ 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows 
l O O . f l O which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
t 0 O t O Q representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
) 0 0 « 0 Q representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at 8 . 3 % per annum with monthly payments of $ O O o * 
which include C8 principal, H interest, OS taxes, E_ insurance, • condo fees, • other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include D principal, D interest, • taxes, D insurance, D condo fees, D other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows 
Other . 
LOO TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
nd/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
Itcation within 1 0 days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
te not to exceed 8 * 5 7 o/0 |f Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within 3 0 days after Seller s acceptance 
ment this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to Q mortgage loan discount 
exceed $ In addition seller agrees to pay $ Q to be used for Buyer s other loan costs 
NDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller * oresems inai o«..o. ^ 
itract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest sh& nade as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnfc. MJ and marketable tme 10 um yiup*,.
 v , 
brances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by QCa current policy of title insurance in the amount of pi «nase price D an abstract of title brought current, 
torney's opinion (See Section H). 
iPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall take title 
any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has Cfchas not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
iSTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: As directed by Buyer - . _ 
zLLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:. 
>ns to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:. 
PECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
closing: Seller to have the right to market mdsell^this^prc^ert^ 
pletion of their new home located at ^ ; j f f i p B ^ , 
s offer is null and void if property is Sbld to^a thirdNparty prior to completion 
lers new home, 
CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before IS May - , 19 87 . at a reasonable location to be designated by 
subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
jreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of • date of possession Q date of closing • other • ; 
POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer o n D a t e 0 1 C l o s i n g unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent M a x K , L l o y d represents ( ) Seller ( X ) Buyer, 
e selling agent Max K. Lloyd 
represents ( ) Seller (X )'Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
i disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) ( < ) Seller's initials. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
:PTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
until N n n n (AM/PM) %6 D e c 
6Y/ to the Buyer. ^ / _ ^ 
sr's Signature) [ V J J ~4 ^ ( N / j (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
19 8 7 , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
r's" Signature) ( ^ / J j ^ ( V J- ( ' 
r's'Signature) "" (i (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
:CK ONE 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's initials) 
COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the a^ached Addendum, and 
resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until , 19 ^ Q to accept the terms 
perifred below. 
Seue/L d Nor HAe><~£ ft>(^ /\-*/y /%//<. ESTATE jfle 
-&jr-£^£^r~ /VV^7 /-'op P* ZciL ce*rmt frc/fz. i67-39<n~ sw-nt-m 
Signatun 
Jeter's ire) M£U 




(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
HECK ONE: 
jfl ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
3 REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
Q COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
i$ri s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
r Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 








B. • I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
- -*.._:, — ,
 r o t l l p n r A c e j D t attached hereto to the • Seller • Buyer. Sent by - - > • • * •. 
. , 1 9 . -by 
ADDENDUM "G" 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, men uum v»*^  . _ 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII . 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 




1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] , 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
ADDENDUM MH" 
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Amendment and Revision 
Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant .] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
Section 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Sect ion 1. [Inherent and inal ienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable r ight to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authori ty for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to al ter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable par t of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rus t or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear 
a rms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1984 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
443 
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mance of any of the acts specified in this chapter from 
any person except the principal broker with whom he 
is affiliated and licensed. An inactive licensee is not 
authorized to conduct real estate transactions until 
he becomes affiliated with a licensed principal bro-
ker. No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate 
with more than one principal broker a t the same 
time. Except as provided by rule, a principal broker 
may not be responsible for more than one real estate 
brokerage at the same time. 1987 
61-2-11. Investigations — Subpoena power of 
division — Revocat ion or suspens ion 
of l icense — Grounds. 
The division may investigate or cause to be investi-
gated the actions of any principal broker, associate 
broker, sales agent, real estate school, course pro-
vider, or school instructor licensed or certified by this 
state, or of any applicant for licensure or certification, 
or of any person who acts in any of those capacities 
within this state. The division is empowered to sub-
poena witnesses, take evidence, and require by sub-
poena duces tecum the production of books, papers, 
contracts, records, other documents, or information 
considered relevant to the investigation. Each failure 
to respond to a subpoena is considered as a separate 
violation of this chapter. The commission, with the 
concurrence of the director, may impose a civil pen-
alty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation or 
3uspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny reissu-
ance of any license or the certification of a real estate 
school course provider or instructor if at any t ime the 
licensee or certificate holder, whether acting as an 
agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character 
likely to influence, persuade, or induce; 
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course 
of misrepresentation, or of making false promises 
through agents, sales agents, advertising, or oth-
erwise; 
(4) acting for more than one party in a trans-
action without the informed consent of all par-
ties; 
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent 
while not licensed with a licensed principal bro-
ker, representing or at tempting to represent a 
broker other than the principal broker with 
whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales 
agent or having a contractual relationship simi-
lar to tha t of sales agent with other than a li-
censed principal broker; 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to ac-
count for or to remit any monies coming into his 
possession which belong to others, or commin-
gling those funds with his own, or diverting those 
funds from the purpose for which they were re-
ceived; 
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consider-
ation, as defined by the commission, to any per-
son not licensed under this chapter, except tha t 
valuable consideration may be shared with a li-
censed principal broker of another jurisdiction or 
fc as provided under the Professional Corporation 
Act; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent 
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of 
the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all 
documents to all parties executing the docu-
ments; 
(10) failing to keep and make available for in-
spection by the division a record of each transac-
tion, including the names of buyers and sellers, 
the identification of the property, the sale price, 
any monies received in trust , any agreements or 
instructions from buyers or sellers, and any other 
information required by rule; 
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the pur-
chase or sale of property, whether the purchase 
or sale is made for himself or for an undisclosed 
principal; 
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude; 
(13) advertising the availability of real estate 
or the services of a licensee in a false, misleading, 
or deceptive manner; 
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a li-
censee who is a branch manager, failing to exer-
cise reasonable supervision over the activities of 
his licensees and any unlicensed staff; 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an 
order of the commission, or the rules adopted by 
the commission and the division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a li-
censee to his principal in a real estate transac-
tion; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dis-
honest dealing; or 
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by stat-
ute or rule. 1991 
61-2-12. Disciplinary action — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty, revok-
ing, suspending, placing on probation, or re-
issuance of any license or certificate, the di-
vision shall give notice to the licensee or cer-
tificate holder and schedule an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
(ii) If the licensee is an active sales agent 
or active associate broker, the division shall 
inform the principal broker with whom the 
licensee is affiliated of the charge and of the 
t ime and place of the hearing. 
(iii) If after the hearing the commission 
determines tha t any licensee or certificate 
holder is guilty of a violation of this chapter, 
the license or certificate may be suspended, 
revoked, denied reissuance, or a civil penalty 
may be imposed by writ ten order of the com-
mission in concurrence with the director. 
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the commis-
sion to an administrative law judge, and a ruling 
has been issued by the commission and the direc-
tor, the licensee or certificate holder may request 
reconsideration by the commission by filing a 
writ ten request stat ing specific grounds upon 
which relief is requested. 
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, licensee, 
or person aggrieved, including the complainant, 
may obtain judicial review or agency review by 
the executive director of any adverse ruling, or-
der, or decision of the director and the commis-
sion. 
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or li-
censee prevails in the appeal and the court finds 
tha t the state action was undertaken without 
substantial justification, the court may award 
reasonable litigation expenses to the applicant, 
certificate holder, or licensee as provided under 
ADDENDUM " J " 
463 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISIOI 
Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act. 
(c) (if No order, rule, or decision of the director 
and the commission may take effect until 30 
days after the time for appeal to the court 
has expired. 
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the 
division shall stay enforcement of the com-
mission's action in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 63-46b-18. 
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(3) The commission and the director shall comply 
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings. 1991 
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal 
broker's license — Automatic in-
activation of affiliated associate bro-
kers and sales agents licenses. 
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chap-
ter committed by any real estate sales agent or asso-
ciate broker employed or engaged as an independent 
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal bro-
ker or committed by any employee, officer, or member 
of a licensed principal broker is cause for the revoca-
tion, suspension, or probation of the principal bro-
ker's license, or for the imposition of a fine against 
the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500 
per violation. 
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal bro-
ker license automatically inactivates every associate 
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons 
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker 
whose license was revoked or suspended, pending a 
change of broker affiliation. A principal broker shall, 
prior to the effective date of the suspension or revoca-
tion of his license, notify in writing every licensee 
affiliated with him of the revocation or suspension of 
his license. 1991 
61-2-14. List of licensees to be available. 
The division shall make available at reasonable 
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons 
licensed by it under this chapter. 1963 
61-2-15, 61-2-16. R e p e a l e d . 1973 
61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter. 
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addi-
tion to being subject to a license sanction or a fine 
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a 
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any 
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six 
months. If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon 
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A mis-
demeanor. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent 
violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree 
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed 
two years. If a corporation is convicted of a second or 
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree 
felony. Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any 
member or agent of a partnership or association, who 
personally participates in or is an accessory to any 
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partner-
ship, or association, is subject to the penalties pre-
scribed for individuals. 
(2) If any person receives any money or its equiva-
lent, as commission, compensation, or profit by or in 
consequence of a violation of this chapter, that person 
is liable for an additional penalty of not less than the 
amount of the money received and not more than 
three times the amount of mom 
determined by the court. This 
for in any court of competent ji 
ered by any person aggrieved 
benefit. 
(3) All fines imposed by the 
executive director pursuant to 
deposited into the Real Estate 
and Recovery Fund to be used i: 
with the requirements of the 
Fund Act. 
61-2-18. Actions for recove: 
restricted. 
(1) No person may br ing or i 
any court of this s ta te for the i 
sion, fee, or compensation for a: 
rendered which is prohibited i 
other than licensed principal br 
son was duly licensed as a pr 
t ime of the doing of the act or i 
(2) No sales agent or associs 
his own name for the recovery c 
compensation for services a s i 
ciate broker unless the action i 
broker with whom he is or wa 
for the recovery of a fee, comi 
pensation may only be instituf 
principal broker with whom tl 
ciate broker is affiliated. 
61-2-19. R e p e a l e d 
61-2-20. R i g h t s a n d privil< 
censeeSc 
Real estate licensees may 
proved by the Utah Real Est* 
attorney general and those foi 
with the following exceptior 
(1) Principal brokers 
may fill out any documi 
closing of a real es ta te 
(2) Real estate license 
ta te forms prepared by 1< 
seller, lessor, or lessee, ( 
vided tha t the Real Est 
torney general have not 
necessary to tha t t ransa 
61-2-21. R e m e d i e s a n d f 
(1) (a) If the director he 
any person has been or 
tut ing violations of this 
to the director tha t i t i 
terest to stop such acts 
upon the person an ord 
cease and desist from 
(b) Within ten days 
the person upon whor 
request an adjudicati 
(c) Pending the he£ 
order shall remain ii 
(d) If a request for i 
sion shall follow th( 
ments of Title 63, C 
(2) (a) After the heari: 
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person violate this cl 
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desist order pe rman 
(b) If no hear ing is 
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Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Ac-
cess tq^Justice Act. 
(c) (fTfto order, rule, or decision of the director 
and the commission may take effect until 30 
days after the time for appeal to the court 
has expired. 
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the 
division shall stay enforcement of the com-
mission's action in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 63-46b-18. 
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(3) The commission and the director shall comply 
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings. 1991 
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal 
broker's license — Automatic in-
activation of affiliated associate bro-
kers and sales agents licenses. 
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chap-
ter committed by any real estate sales agent or asso-
ciate broker employed or engaged as an independent 
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal bro-
ker or committed by any employee, officer, or member 
of a licensed principal broker is cause for the revoca-
tion, suspension, or probation of the principal bro-
ker's license, or for the imposition of a fine against 
the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500 
per violation. 
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal bro-
ker license automatically inactivates every associate 
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons 
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker 
whose license was revoked or suspended, pending a 
change of broker affiliation. A principal broker shall, 
prior to the effective date of the suspension or revoca-
tion of his license, notify in writing every licensee 
affiliated with him of the revocation or suspension of 
his license. 1991 
61-2-14. List of licensees to be available. 
The division shall make available at reasonable 
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons 
licensed by it under this chapter. 1983 
61-2-15, 61-2-16. Repealed. 1973 
61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter. 
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addi-
tion to being subject to a license sanction or a fine 
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a 
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any 
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six 
months. If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon 
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A mis-
demeanor. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent 
violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree 
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed 
two years. If a corporation is convicted of a second or 
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree 
felony. Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any 
member or agent of a partnership or association, who 
personally participates in or is an accessory to any 
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partner-
ship, or association, is subject to the penalties pre-
scribed for individuals. 
(2) If any person receives any money or its equiva-
i—i.
 n„ «^mmission, compensation, or profit by or in 
' - - t.Un+ narxnn 
three times the amount of money received, as may be 
determined by the court. This penalty may be sued 
for in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recov-
ered by any person aggrieved for his own use and 
benefit. 
(3) All fines imposed by the commission and the 
executive director pursuant to this chapter shall be 
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research, 
and Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent 
with the requirements of the Real Estate Recovery 
Fund Act. 1986 
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation 
restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of a commis-
sion, fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to 
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the per-
son was duly licensed as a principal broker at the 
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in 
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
compensation for services as a sales agent or asso-
ciate broker unless the action is against the principal 
broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action 
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other com-
pensation may only be instituted and brought by the 
principal broker with whom the sales agent or asso-
ciate broker is affiliated. 1985 
61-2-19. Repealed. 1983 
61-2-20. Rights and privileges of real estate li-
censees. 
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms ap-
proved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the 
attorney general and those forms provided by statute, 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers 
may fill out any documents associated with the 
closing of a real estate transaction. 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real es-
tate forms prepared by legal counsel of the buyer, 
seller, lessor, or lessee, or any legal counsel, pro-
vided that the Real Estate Commission and at-
torney general have not approved a specific form 
necessary to that transaction. 1985 
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations. 
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that 
any person has been or is engaging in acts consti-
tuting violations of this chapter, and if it appears 
to the director that it would be in the public in-
terest to stop such acts, he shall issue and serve 
upon the person an order directing that person to 
cease and desist from those acts. 
(b) Within ten days after receiving the order, 
the person upon whom the order is served may 
request an adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) Pending the hearing, the cease and desist 
order shall remain in effect. 
(d) If a request for a hearing is made, the divi-
sion shall follow the procedures and require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b. 
(2) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and 
the executive director agree that the acts of the 
person violate this chapter, the executive direc-
tor shall issue an order making the cease and 
desist order permanent. 
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person 
" *„ /M. nftpr discontinuing the 
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may exclude evidence tha t is irrele-
immaterial , or unduly repetitious; 
shall exclude evidence privileged in 
:ourts of Utah; 
) may receive documentary evidence in 
brm of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
rpt contains all pert inent portions of the 
nal document; 
0 may take official notice of any facts 
could be judicially noticed under the 
a Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
r proceedings before the agency, and of 
nical or scientific facts within the 
icy's specialized knowledge, 
e presiding officer may not exclude evi-
)lely because it is hearsay, 
le presiding officer shall afford to all par-
opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
I evidence. 
le presiding officer may give persons not 
to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
to present oral or writ ten statements a t 
iring. 
II testimony presented at the hearing, if 
as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
a on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
Tie hear ing shall be recorded a t the 
's expense. 
Iny party, a t his own expense, may have a 
approved by the agency prepare a tran-
of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
te agency is permitted by statute to impose 
tect confidential information disclosed at 
faring. 
Ul hearings shall be open to all parties, 
section does not preclude the presiding of-
taking appropriate measures necessary to 
tie integrity of the hearing. 1988 
Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Intervention. 
person not a party may file a signed, writ-
>n to intervene in a formal adjudicative pro-
rith the agency. The person who wishes to 
shall mail a copy of the petition to each 
Le petition shall include: 
the agency's file number or other reference 
yer, 
the name of the proceeding; 
a s ta tement of facts demonstrating tha t the 
ioner's legal r ights or interests are substan-
/ affected by the formal adjudicative pro-
ing, or tha t the petitioner qualifies as an in-
3nor under any provision of law; and 
) a s ta tement of the relief tha t the petitioner 
s from the agency. 
e presiding officer shall grant a petition for 
tion if he determines that : 
) the petitioner's legal interests may be sub-
ttially affected by the formal adjudicative 
reeding; and 
>) the interests of justice and the orderly and 
u p t conduct of the adjudicative proceedings 
not be materially impaired by allowing the 
jrvention. 
) Any order grant ing or denying a petition to 
jrvene shall be in writing and sent by mail to 
petitioner and each party, 
b) An order permitting intervention may im-
e conditions on the intervener's participation 
he adjudicative proceeding tha t are necessary 
for a just , orderly, and prompt conduct of the ad-
judicative proceeding. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the condi-
tions at any t ime after the intervention. 1987 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable t ime after the hear-
ing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable s ta tute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order tha t includes: 
(a) a s tatement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evi-
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed-
ings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a s tatement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a s tatement of the reasons for the pre-
siding officer's decision; 
(d) a s tatement of any relief ordered by 
the agency; 
(e) a notice of the r ight to apply for recon-
* sideration* 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative 
or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any recon-
sideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experi-
ence, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact tha t was contested may 
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presid-
ing officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings 
on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and effi-
cient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
1988 
63-46b-Il. Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of de-
fault against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative 
proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly sched-
uled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative pro-
ceeding fails to file a response under Section 
63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a s ta tement of 
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the 
agency set aside the default order, and any order 
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent 
to the default order, by following the procedures 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any 
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding 
officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review 
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration un-
der Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the 
default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the 
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun 
by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after 
issuing the order of default, conduct any further 
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudica-
tive proceeding without the participation of the 
party in default and shall determine all issues in 
the adjudicative proceeding, including those af-
fecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no 
parties other than the agency and the party in 
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1888 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
., (1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par-
* ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, 
the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
the order with the person or entity designated for 
that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the 
relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was 
mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
quest for review, or within the time period provided 
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute 
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the re-
sponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
agency or superior agency shall review the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time required 
by statute or the agency's-rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall containr 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review. 1988 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request, the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied. 1988 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. i988 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody. 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to ail parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
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Iges — Terms — Functions 
jes. 
eals jurisdiction. 
;ions by Supreme Court. 
ourt of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
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nd which involves the business regulatory functions 
f the state, a court may award reasonable litigation 
xpenses to any small business which is a named 
arty if the small business prevails in the appeal and 
he court finds that the state action was undertaken 
/ithout substantial justification. 
(2) Any state agency or political subdivision may 
equire by rule or ordinance that a small business 
>xhaust administrative remedies prior to making a 
:laim under this act. 1983 
T8-27a-6. Payment of expenses awarded — 
Statement required in agency's bud-
get. 
Expenses awarded under this act shall be paid from 
funds in the regular operating budget of the state 
entity. If sufficient funds are not available in the bud-
get of the entity, the expenses shall be considered a 
claim governed by the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 
6. Every state entity against which litigation ex-
penses have been awarded under this act shall, at the 
time of submission of its proposed budget, submit a 
report to the governmental body which appropriates 
its funds in which the amount of expenses awarded 
and paid under this act during the fiscal year is 
stated. 1983 
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78-27b-102. Equine activity liability limitations. 
78-27b-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Equine" means any member of the 
equidae family. 
(2) "Equine activity" means: 
(a) equine shows, fairs, competitions, per-
formances, racing, sales, or parades that in-
volve any breeds of equines and any equine 
disciplines, including dressage, hunter and 
jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping, 
multiple-day events, combined training, ro-
deos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple 
chasing, hunting, endurance trail riding, 
and western games; 
(b) boarding or training equines; 
(c) teaching persons equestrian skills; 
(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an 
equine owned by another person regardless 
of whether the owner receives monetary or 
other valuable consideration; 
(e) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an 
equine by a prospective purchaser; or 
(f) other equine activities of any type in-
cluding rides, trips, hunts, or informal or 
spontaneous activities sponsored by an 
equine activity sponsor. 
(3) "Equine activity sponsor" means an indi-
vidual, group, club, partnership, or corporation, 
whether operating for profit or as a nonprofit en-
tity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facili-
ties for an equine activity, including: 
(a) pony clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, 4-
H programs, therapeutic riding programs, 
and public and private schools and post sec-
ondary educational instituti 
equine activities; and 
(b) operators, instructors 
of equine facilities, stab 
ponyride strings, fairs, anc 
(4) "Equine professional" mea 
pensated for an equine activity 
(a) instructing a particip 
(b) renting to a participe 
ride, drive, or be a pass 
equine; or 
(c) renting equine equipr 
participant. 
(5) "Participant" means any 
amateur or professional, who di 
an equine activity, regardless 
has been paid to participate. 
(6) (a) "Person engaged in ar 
means a person who ride 
drives, or works with an 
(b) Subsection (a) does n< 
tator at an equine activity c 
an equine activity who doe 
lead, or drive an equine. 
78-27b-102. Equine activity liab 
(1) An equine activity sponsor i 
sional is not liable for an injury to 
participant engaged in an equine at 
sponsor or professional: 
(a) (i) provided the equipme 
(ii) the equipment or ta 
jury; 
(b) (i) provided the equine; 
(ii) failed to make reasor 
efforts to determine whet 
(A) the participan 
safely in the equine a 
manage the particula 
(B) the equine cou 
with the participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is i 
and control of land or facilitie 
participant sustained injuries 
gerous condition which was k: 
have been known to the spom 
and for which warning signs r 
spicuously posted; 
(d) (i) commits an act or oir 
tutes negligence, gross nej 
or wanton disregard for th 
ticipant; and 
(ii) that act or omission 
or 
(e) intentionally injures or c 
the participant. 
(2) This chapter does not preve 
bility of an equine activity sponso 
fessional who is: 
(a) a veterinarian licensee 
Chapter 28, in an action to re 
incurred in the course of pro 
treatment of an equine; 
(b) liable under Title 4, C 
and Trespassing Animals; or 
(c) liable under Title 78, C 
Liability Act. 
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senting his own interests in a cause to which he is a 
party in his own right and not as assignee. 1963 
78-51-26. Duties of attorneys and counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
(1) to support the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States and of this state; 
(2) to maintain the respect due to the courts of 
justice and judicial officers; 
(3) to counsel or maintain no other action, pro-
ceeding or defense than that which appears to 
him legal and just, excepting the defense of a 
person charged with a public offense; 
(4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining 
the causes confided to him such means only as 
are consistent with truth, and never to seek to 
mislead the judges by any artifice or false state-
ment of fact or law; 
(5) to maintain inviolate the confidences, and 
at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets; 
of his client; 
(6) to abstain from all offensive personality, 
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or 
reputation of a party or a witness, unless re-
quired by the justice of the cause with which he 
is charged; 
(7) not to encourage either the commencement 
or continuance of an action or proceeding from 
any corrupt motive or passion or interest; 
(8) never to reject for any consideration per-
sonal to himself the cause of the defenseless or 
the oppressed; and 
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and 
regulations prescribed by the board of commis-
sioners of the Utah State Bar and to pay the fees 
provided by law. 1953 
78-51-27. Certain conduct forbidden — Penalty. 
An attorney or counselor shall not: 
(1) directly or indirectly buy, or be in any 
manner interested in buying or having assigned 
to him, for the purpose of collection, a bond, 
promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or 
other thing in action, with the intent and for the 
purpose of bringing an action thereon. 
(2) by himself, or by or in the name of another 
person, either before or after action brought, 
promise or give, or procure to be promised or 
given, a valuable consideration to any person as 
an inducement to placing, or in consideration of 
having placed, in his hands or in the hands of 
another person a demand of any kind for the pur-
pose of bringing action thereon or of representing 
the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy 
for the recovery thereof; but this subdivision does 
not apply to any agreement between attorneys 
and counselors to divide between themselves the 
compensation to be received. 
An attorney or counselor who violates either of the 
foregoing subdivisions of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly, and 
his license to practice may be revoked or suspended. 
1953 
78-51-28. Exceptions. 
The next preceding section [Section 78-51-27] does 
not prohibit an attorney or counselor from receiving a 
bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or 
other thing in action, in payment for property sold, or 
for services actually rendered, or for a debt 
antecedently contracted; or from buying or receiving 
a bill of exchange, draft or other thing in action for 
the purpose of remittance an 
late that section. 
78-51-29. Permitting use < 
Penalty. 
If an attorney knowingly \ 
being his general law partnei 
to sue out any process or to } 
action in his name as counsel 
such attorney, and every p< 
name, is guilty of a misdeme 
ished accordingly, and his lie 
revoked or suspended. 
78-51-30. Partnership wit 
An attorney who directly < 
relation to, or aids or promc 
actiun or proceeding in any c 
which is carried on, aided or j 
public prosecutor with whom 
or indirectly connected as a { 
himself prosecuted or in am 
moted any action or proceedin 
prosecutor, afterwards direct 
in relation to, or takes an; 
thereof as an attorney or oth 
receives any valuable conside 
of any defendant in any such 
standing or agreement whate 
relating to the defense there* 
meanor and shall be punish* 
license to practice may be revc 
78-51-31. Deceit and colic 
An attorney and counselor \ 
collusion, or who consents thi 
ceive a court or judge or a pa 
ceeding is liable to be disbar 
the injured party treble dama 
civil action. 
78-51-32. Authority of a 
selors. 
An attorney and counselor 
(1) to execute in the m 
or other written instr 
proper for the prosecution 
ing about to be or alread: 
prosecution or defense of i 
an action, proceeding or f 
therein. 
(2) to bind his client ir 
action or proceeding by h 
the clerk or entered up 
court, and not otherwise 
(3) to receive money c 
an action or proceeding 
thereof or after judgment 
his authority is filed, and 
and not otherwise, to dis 
knowledge satisfaction of 
78-51-33. Proof of authori 
The court may on motion of 
showing of reasonable groun 
attorney for the adverse part: 
eral adverse parties, to produ 
oath or otherwise the author 
pears, and until he does so m 
by him on behalf of the partie 
to appear. 
78-51-34. Change of attar 
The attorney in any actioi 
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for lease or rent, procuring prospective tenants or les-
sees, negotiating lea^e or rental terms, and executing 
lease or rental agreements 
R162-5-3. Exemptions. 
5.3 This rule does not apply to* 
5.3.1 Support Services. Individuals who, as regular 
salaried employees of a licensed property management 
company or a licensed principal broker: show properties 
to prospective tenants; provide services as bookkeepers; 
function as secretaries, maintenance stafT, and rent col-
lectors; or who fill out pre-printed lease or rental agree-
ments, the terms of which are not negotiable by the 
person completing the form. 
5.3.2 Resident Manager. Individuals who reside on-
site at the property address; or 
5.3.3 Owners or Employees. Individuals who are own-
ers or regular salaried employees of an owner and who 
do not provide property management services for more 
than one employer. 
R162-5-4. Broker Supervision. 
5.4 All property management conducted by a salesa-
gent or associate broker is to be supervised by the prin-
cipal broker with whom the licensee is affiliated. 
Rl62-5-5. Separate Company. 
5.5 A license to operate a property management com-
pany separate from the real estate brokerage will be 
granted upon compliance with the following conditions: 
5.5.1 Application. The principal broker must submit 
to the Division an application form required by the 
Division together with the proper application fee. 
5.5.2 Business Name Approval. The applicant must 
submit evidence that the name of the new company has 
been approved by the Division of Corporations of the 
Department of Commerce. 
5.5.3 Company Affiliation. The principal broker must 
designate the company affiliation of each of the licens-
ees affiliated with him in either the brokerage or the 
property management company. 
KEY: real estate business 
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R162-6. Licensee Conduct. 
R162-6-1. Improper Practices. 
R162-6-2. Standards of Practice. 
R162-6-1. Improper Practices. 
6.1.1 Loan Fraud. A licensee shall not participate in a 
transaction in which a buyer enters into any agreement 
that is not disclosed to the lender, which, if disclosed, 
may have a material effect on the terms or the granting 
of the loan. 
6.1.1.1 Double Contracts. A licensee shall not use or 
propose the use of two or more contracts of sale or Ear-
nest Money Sales Agreements, one of which is not made 
known to the prospective lender or loan guarantor. 
6.1.2 Signs. It is prohibited for any licensee to have a 
sign on real property without the written consent of the 
property owner. 
6.1.3 Licensee's Interest in a Transaction. A licensee 
shall not buy, sell, or lease/rent any real property as a 
t e
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principal either directly or mdirectK without nr-t di 
closing, m writing on the Earnest Monej Saie- Agrer 
ment or the leasts rental agreement his true position as 
principal in the transaction. A licensee will be consid-
ered to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he 
is an owner, officer, director, partner, member, or 
employee of an entity which is a principal in the trans-
action. In the case of a licensee who is a stockholder but 
who is not an officer, director or employee of a corpora-
tion which is a principal in the transaction, the licensee 
will be considered to be a principal for the purposes of 
this rule if he owns more than 10% of the stock of the 
corporation. 
6.1.4 Listing Content. The real estate licensee com-
pleting a listing agreement is responsible to make rea-
sonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of the 
listing. 
6.1.4.1 Net listings are prohibited and shall not be 
taken by a licensee. 
6.1.5 Advertising. 
6.1.5.1 Any advertising by active licensees that does 
not include the name of the real estate brokerage is pro-
hibited except as otherwise stated herein. 
6.1.5.2 If the licensee advertises property in which he 
has an ownership interest and the property is not 
listed, the ad need not appear over the name of the real 
estate brokerage if the ad includes the phrase "owner-
agent". 
6.1.5.3 Under no circumstances should a licensee 
advertise or offer to sell property at a lower price than 
that listed without the written consent of the seller. 
6.1.6 Double Commissions. In order to avoid subject-
ing the seller to paying double commissions, licensees 
must not sell listed properties other than through the 
listing broker. A licensee shall not subject a principal to 
paying a double commission without the principal's 
consent. 
6.1.6.1 A licensee shall not enter or attempt to enter 
into a concurrent agency representation agreement 
with a buyer or a seller when the licensee knows or 
should know of an existing agency representation 
agreement with another licensee. 
6.1.7 Retention of Buyer's Deposit. A principal broker 
holding an earnest money deposit shall not be entitled 
to any of the deposit without the written consent of the 
buyer and the seller. 
6.1.8 Unprofessional conduct. No licensee shall 
engage in any of the practices described in 61-2-2, et 
seq. (1953, as amended), whether acting as agent or on 
his own account, in a manner which fails to conform 
with accepted standards of the real estate sales, leasing 
or management industries and which could jeopardize 
the public health, safety, or welfare and includes the 
violation of any provision of 61-2-2, et seq. (1953, as 
amended) or the rules of this chapter. 
6.1.9 Finder's Fees. A licensee may not pay a finder's 
fee or give any valuable consideration to an unlicensed 
person or entity for referring a prospect in a real estate 
transaction, except as provided in this rule. 
6.1.9.1 Token gifts. A licensee may give a gift valued 
at less than $50 to an individual in appreciation for an 
unsolicited referral of a prospect which resulted in a 
real estate transaction. 
R162-6-2 Standards of Practice. 
6 2 1 Approved Forms The following standard forms 
are approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and 
the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licens-
ees 
(a) July 1, 1987 Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
(b) October 1, 1988 Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
for Residential Construction, 
(c) January 1, 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
(d) October 1, 1983 All Inclusive Trust Deed, 
(e) October 1, 1983 All Inclusive Promissory Note 
Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed 
6 2 1 1 Forms Required for Closing Principal brokers 
and associate brokers may fill out forms in addition to 
the standard state-approved forms if the additional 
forms are necessary to close a transaction Examples 
include, but are not limited to, closing statements, and 
warranty or quit claim deeds 
6 2 12 Forms Prepared by an Attorney Any licensee 
may fill out forms prepared by the buyer's attorney or 
the seller's attorney to be used m place of any form 
listed in Rule 6 2 1 (a) through (e) if the buyer or the 
seller requests that such forms be used and the licensee 
verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the 
buyer's or seller's attorney 
6 2 1 3 Additional Forms If it is necessary for a lic-
ensee to use a form for which there is no state-approved 
form (e g , a lease), the licensee may fill in the blanks on 
any form which has been prepared by an attorney, 
regardless of whether the attorney was employed for 
the purpose by the buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, broker-
age, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling 
blank legal forms 
6 2 14 Standard Supplementary Clauses There are 
Standard Supplementary Clauses approved by the 
Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to 
Earnest Money Sales Agreements by all licensees The 
use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be 
considered the unauthorized practice of law 
6 2 2 Copies of Earnest Money Sales Agreement After 
an Earnest Money Sales Agreement is properly signed 
by both the buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of 
each participating licensee to cause copies thereof, 
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the 
buyer and seller with whom such licensee is dealing 
The licensee preparing the document shall not have the 
parties sign for a final copy of the document prior to all 
parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to 
the terms thereof 
6 2 3 Residential Construction Agreement The Ear-
nest Money Sales Agreement for Residential Construc-
tion must be used for all transactions for the 
construction of dwellings to be built or presently under 
construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has 
not been issued 
6 2 4 Employee Licensee A real estate licensee work-
ing as a regular salaned employee as defined in section 
1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the 
employer, may only do so and may only be compensated 
directly by the employer under one of the following con-
ditions (1) the licensee is a principal broker, (2) the 
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom 
the licensee affiliates, or (3) the employer contracts 
with a principal broker so that all employed licensees 
arp affiliated with and ^uptrvi^ed bv a principal brokc^ 
6 2 5 Real Estate ^uctiona \ principal bru^*- \u 
contracts or in anv manner affiliates with an autM necr 
or auction company which is not licensed under the pro-
visions of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-1 et seq 
(1953, as amended) for the purpose of enabling that 
auctioneer or auction company to auction real property 
in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all 
aspects of the auction comply with the requirements of 
this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to 
real estate licensees in real estate transactions Auc-
tioneers and auction companies who are not licensed 
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-2-1 et seq (1953, as amended) may conduct auctions 
of real property located within this state upon the fol-
lowing conditions 
6 2 5 1 Advertising All advertising and promotional 
materials associated with an auction must conspicu-
ously disclose that the auction is conducted under the 
supervision of a named principal broker licensed in this 
state, and 
6 2 5 2 Supervision The auction must be conducted 
under the supervision of a principal broker licensed in 
this state who must be present at the auction, and 
6 2 5 3 Use of Approved Forms Any Earnest Money 
Sales Agreements used at the auction must meet the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-20 
(1953, as amended) and must be filled out by a Utah 
real estate licensee, and 
6 2 5 4 Placement of Deposits All monies deposited at 
the auction must be placed either in the real estate 
trust account of the principal broker who is supervising 
the auction or in an escrow depository agreed to m writ-
ing by the parties to the transaction 
6 2 5 5 Closing Arrangements The principal broker 
supervising the auction shall be responsible to assure 
that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of 
each real estate transaction arising out of the auction 
6 2 6 Guaranteed Sales As used herein, the term 
"guaranteed sales plan" includes, but is not limited to 
(a) any plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed 
to be sold or, (b) any plan whereby a licensee or anyone 
affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real 
estate if it is not purchased by a third party in the spec-
ified period of a listing or within some other specified 
period of time 
6 2 6 1 In any real estate transaction involving a 
guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall provide full 
disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee 
(a) Written Advertising Any written advertisement 
by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales plan" shall include 
a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligi-
ble, costs and conditions may apply and advising the 
seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the 
guaranteed sales agreement Such information shall be 
set forth in pnnt at least one-fourth as large as the larg-
est print in the advertisement 
(b) Radio/Television Advertising Any radio or televi-
sion advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales 
plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if 
any conditions and limitations apply 
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements Every guaranteed 
sales agreement must be in writing and contain all of 
the conditions and other terms under which the prop-
erty is guaranteed to be sold or purchased, including 
419 Real Et 
:he charges or other costs for the service or plan, the 
price for which the property will be sold or purchased 
md the approximate net proceeds the seller may rea-
sonably expect to receive. 
6 2 7 Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transac-
tion involving a licensee, as agent or principal, the lic-
ensee must clearly disclose in writing to the buyer and 
seller, lessor and lessee, his agency relationship(s). The 
disclosure must be made prior to the buyer and seller, 
lessor and lessee entering into a binding agreement 
with each other and become part of the permanent file. 
When a binding agreement is signed, the prior agency 
disclosure must be confirmed in a separate provision 
incorporated in or attached to that agreement, which 
shall be as follows: 
"AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this 
agreement the listing agent represents ( ) Buyer ( ) 
Seller, and the selling agent represents ( ) Buyer ( ) 
Seller. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing 
this agreement written disclosure of the agency rela-
tionship(s) was provided to him/her. ( ) (Buyer's Ini-
tials) ( ) (Seller's Initials).'' 
6.2.8 Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate bro-
kers must keep their principal broker and/or branch 
manager informed on a timely basis of all real estate 
transactions in which the licensee is involved, as agent 
:>r principal, in which the licensee has received funds on 
t>ehalf of the principal broker or in which an offer has 
oeen written. 
6.2.9 Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and asso-
ciate brokers who are branch managers shall be respon-
sible for exercising active supervision over the conduct 
of all licensees affiliated with them. 
6.2.9.1 A broker will not be held responsible for inad-
squate supervision if: 
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Utah 
Code Annotated 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules promul-
gated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising 
broker's specific written policies or instructions; and 
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the 
broker to ensure that licensees receive adequate super-
vision and the broker has followed those procedures; 
and 
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker 
attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage; and 
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and 
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and 
(0 The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the 
violation. 
6.2.9.2 The existence of an independent contractor 
relationship or any other special compensation 
arrangement between the broker and affiliated licens-
ees shall not release the broker and licensees of any 
duties, obligations, or responsibilities. 
6.2.10 Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who 
is acting as an agent in a transaction will receive any 
type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction 
in addition to a real estate commission, that fee must be 
disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction. 
6.2.11 Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee 
for referral of prospects to builders must be paid to the 
licensee by the principal broker with whom he is 
licensed and affiliated. All such fees must be disclosed 
as required by Rule 6.2.10. 
6.2.12 Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a 
t e
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licensee refers a prospect to a manufactured home 
dealer or a mobile home dealer, as such terms are 
defined in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-56-1, et 
seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be 
paid to him by the principal broker with whom he is 
licensed and affiliated if the sale of the manufactured 
home or mobile home was made in conjunction with the 
sale or lease of real property. If the sale was not made 
as part of a transaction involving the sale or lease of 
real property, the fee is not a real estate commission 
and need not be paid to the licensee by his principal bro-
ker; however, the fee must be disclosed as required by 
Rule 6.2.10. 
6.2.13 Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a prin-
cipal broker to a buyer or seller in a real estate transac-
tion as an inducement to use the services of a 
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the ser-
vices of a brokerage, is permissible and is not an illegal 
sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered 
to a party who will not be obligated to pay a real estate 
commission in a transaction, the principal broker must 
obtain from the party who will pay the commission 
written consent that the inducement be offered. 
6.2.14 "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees 
have an affirmative duty to disclose in writing to buyers 
and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "due-
on-sale" clause in an underlying encumbrance on real 
property, and the potential consequences of selling or 
purchasing a property without obtaining the authoriza-
tion of the holder of the underlying encumbrance. 
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R162-7. Enforcement. 
R162-7-1. Filing of Complaint. 
R162-7-2. Notice of Complaint. 
R162-7-3. Investigation and Enforcement. 
R162-7-4. Corrective Notice. 
R162-7-1. Filing of Complaint. 
7.1 An aggrieved person may file a complaint in writ-
ing against a licensee; or the Division or the Commis-
sion may initiate a complaint upon its own motion for 
alleged violation of the provisions of these rules or of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as 
amended). The Division will not entertain complaints 
between licensees regarding claims to commissions. 
R162-7-2. Notice of Complaint. 
7.2 When the Division notifies a licensee of a com-
plaint against him, the notice must be in writing. The 
licensee must respond to the complaint within ten busi-
ness days after receipt of the notice from the Division. 
Failure to respond to the notice of complaint or any sub-
sequent requests for information from the Division 
within the required time period, will be considered an 
additional violation of these rules and separate grounds 
for disciplinary action against the licensee. 
R162-7-3. Investigation and Enforcement. 
7.3 The investigative and enforcement activities of 
the Division shall include, but not be limited to the fol-
lowing: investigation of information provided on new 
license applications; evaluation and investigation of 
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